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Seeking a Definition of Medical Futility with 
Reference to the Louisiana Natural Death Act† 
Frederick R. Parker, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
The general question concerning the existence of a patient’s right in 
the United States either to accept or refuse care at the end of life has largely 
been resolved through a fairly consistent body of jurisprudence, statutory 
schemes, and pronouncements of professional ethics.1 The principal 
statutory expression of this right in Louisiana is found in the Natural Death 
Act (the “Act”), in which the legislature recognized the right of patients 
under certain conditions either to withhold treatment at the outset of care 
or to withdraw treatment that had already been initiated.2 However, the 
legislature left open the ultimate scope of this right, which remains the 
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 † Part of the discussion in this Article is derived from the author’s prior 
analysis in Law, Bioethics, and Medical Futility: Defining Patient Rights at the 
End of Life, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 185 (2015). That work addressed 
the issue of medical futility in the specific context of the Uniform Health Care 
Decisions Act (“UHCDA”) and the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 
(“URTIA”) with respect to both the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and the 
active administration of extreme palliative interventions. Id. This Article 
addresses only the first of those issues, with a specific focus on the Louisiana 
Natural Death Act. A portion of the broader analysis in Law, Bioethics, and 
Medical Futility: Defining Patient Rights at the End of Life that is equally relevant 
to this discussion in the narrow context of the Louisiana Act is presented here with 
the permission of the UALR Law Review. 
  J.D., Louisiana State University (Member, Louisiana Law Review, Class 
of 1987); LL.M. in Health Law, University of Houston; LL.M. in Taxation, New 
York University; Professor, Louisiana State University in Shreveport; Of 
Counsel, Onebane Law Firm, Lafayette and Shreveport, Louisiana. 
 1. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE 
2-3–2-41, 7-7–7-50 (3d ed. 2004). These issues initially arose when surrogates for 
permanently unconscious patients who did not satisfy the legal criteria for whole 
“brain death” began to refuse treatment that offered no reasonable hope of either 
restoring the patient’s capacity or reversing the dying process. See id. at 2-3. 
Perhaps the most widely cited United States Supreme Court case in this regard is 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See also TOM L. 
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 170–81 
(4th ed. 1994) (describing and integrating surrogate judgment making standards 
arising out of jurisprudence). 
 2. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151 (2016). 




subject of debate both in the courts and among physicians, bioethicists, 
and moral philosophers. One of the most significant and problematic of 
these unresolved questions involves the relationship between the Act and 
the elusive concept of “medical futility.” 
Although the Act unambiguously reflects the traditional view of the 
patient’s right of self-determination as a negative one, the contemporary 
variant of the question asks whether a patient’s right to refuse 
recommended treatment necessarily encompasses the right to receive 
interventions that have not been offered, and, if so, what constraints might 
limit the scope of that positive right. Framed from the opposite 
perspective, the question would ask whether, and to what extent, the Act 
would recognize a physician’s authority to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment that a patient has expressly requested—whether 
directly or through a surrogate.3 
Although other states have enacted similar statutory schemes as a 
means of ensuring the patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment,4 
some commentators have argued that the statutes also were intended to 
recognize a physician’s authority to unilaterally withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining procedures on the grounds of medical futility.5 This issue is 
perhaps most problematic when a surrogate for a permanently unconscious 
or otherwise irreversibly incapacitated patient seeks treatment that would 
be beneficial in the sense of postponing the moment of death, but which 
                                                                                                             
 3. Cf. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-24–13-27. 
 4. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170–81. See, e.g., UNIF. 
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989); UNIF. HEALTH-
CARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993). According to Meisel, “several” 
states have adopted the URTIA in either its 1985 or 1989 version. See MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-54–7-58. According to the Uniform Law 
Commission’s Legislative Fact Sheet, the UHCDA had been adopted by Alaska, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wyoming as of 2014, 
although the advance directive statutes of some states appear to be modified forms 
of the UHCDA. Legislative Fact Sheet–Health-Care Decisions Act, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspxtitle=Health-
Care%20Decisions%20Act [https://perma.cc/RT3X-YG4X] (last visited Jan. 10, 
2016). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-55, 7-79–7-89 
(summarizing the law in this regard in other jurisdictions). Notwithstanding the 
narrow scope of this right as expressed in statutory schemes, however, the various 
advance directive statutes are cumulative with existing law. According to Meisel, 
“they are intended to preserve and supplement existing common law and 
constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit them.” See id. at 7-33–7-35. 
 5. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor 
to Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007). 




the attending physician has denied because it offers no reasonable hope as 
a curative measure. 
This Article addresses the specific issue of how the Louisiana Act 
might inform the question of whether, or in what circumstances, treatment 
can be so futile that a patient has no positive right to receive it. As this 
issue most commonly arises in the context of permanently incapacitated 
patients whose surrogates speak on their behalf, it would be appropriate to 
first consider the relevance of a patient’s decisional capacity to the 
question. As a preliminary matter, this Article begins by discussing the 
concept of personhood and the relevance of capacity to the right of a 
severely incapacitated patient to accept or refuse treatment. 
I. PERSONHOOD, DECISIONAL CAPACITY, AND THE 
PROBLEMATIC CONCEPT OF MEDICAL FUTILITY 
The courts, practicing physicians, and bioethicists have long struggled 
in their efforts to define medical futility in a meaningful way, yet they 
remain confounded in the search for a universal meaning of the term that 
fairly accommodates the convergence of law, medicine, and bioethics.6 
The elusive nature of a workable definition stems from the problematic 
relationship between the ambiguity inherent in the concept of futility, the 
subtle uncertainties that inevitably attend the exercise of clinical judgment, 
and the fluid boundaries that define the parameters of professional 
discretion.7 
                                                                                                             
 6. In general, it has been said that futility is not “a discrete and definable 
entity . . . [but] merely the end of the spectrum of therapies with very low 
efficacy.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-14 (quoting John D. Lantos 
et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81, 81 (1989)). 
In the narrow sense, treatment would be considered “futile” if it lacks efficacy in 
terms of accomplishing the specific physiological objective for which it is sought. 
Id. at 13-15. Physicians are generally regarded as having the professional 
prerogative to unilaterally withhold or withdraw such objectively futile clinical 
interventions, and to do so without the patient’s consent. Id. In a broader sense, 
futility has been described as the “inability to prolong life for a time,” or the 
“inability to maintain an acceptable quality of life.” Id. at 13-13 (quoting Stuart J. 
Younger, Who Defines Futility?, 260 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2094, 2095 (1988)). The 
American Medical Association considers decisions about interventions that are 
not futile in an objective physiologic sense to be sufficiently value laden as to 
make them a matter of the patient’s prerogative. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE 
OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 18–19 (2014). 
 7. This lack of consensus presumably becomes increasingly problematic as 
our population ages and as financial considerations increasingly constrain the 
provision of health care, making the issue likely to be both more common and 




At its most fundamental level, the concept of “medical futility” relates 
to the ultimate scope of a physician’s obligation as a matter of law and 
bioethics to avail patients of specific clinical interventions.8 In the most 
narrow, purely objective sense, a treatment regimen would be considered 
“futile” only if it lacks efficacy in terms of being able to accomplish the 
specific physiological objective for which it is employed.9 Thus, an 
intervention that has been scientifically proven to have no physiological 
effect on a patient’s condition would not fall within the standard of care, 
and a physician’s decision not to provide it on the basis of physiological 
futility would stir no controversy.10 At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
and viewed more broadly as a subjective concept, medical futility has been 
described as reflecting the “inability to prolong life for a time,” or the 
“inability to maintain an acceptable quality of life.”11  
As a practical matter, questions about futility tend to arise in 
circumstances that fall between the two extremes of purely objective and 
purely subjective measures, where decisions about the appropriate clinical 
response to a patient’s condition are grounded primarily in objective, 
                                                                                                             
more significant over time. According to Professor Meisel, the futility debate 
might be difficult to resolve because it “revolves around fundamentally 
irresolvable moral conflicts concerning our most deeply held beliefs about the 
value of life.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-13 (quoting E. Haavi 
Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, 24 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 33, 33.) It also has been suggested that the debate 
about medical futility will arise with increasing frequency as the scope of advance 
directives expands beyond their traditional purpose of expressing the patient’s 
wishes concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to 
directing the administration of treatment that physicians might consider to be 
futile. Id. at 7-9–7-10, 13-43–13-44. See also Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 8. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
 9. Id. at 13-14–13-15. 
 10. In its traditional expression, the concept of medical futility most 
commonly relates to a physician’s determination that a treatment regimen offers 
no meaningful benefit to the patient in a physiological sense. Physicians generally 
are regarded as having the professional prerogative to unilaterally withhold or 
withdraw such objectively futile clinical interventions, and to do so without the 
patient’s consent. Id. at 13-14. See also ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER, & 
WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL 
DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 20 (McGraw Hill Educ., 8th ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter CLINICAL ETHICS]. Moreover, all interventions would be considered 
physiologically futile if there is “an utter impossibility” that any of the 
interventions could produce the desired physiological response to the patient’s 
condition. Id. at 27. 
 11. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-13 (quoting Stuart J. Younger, 
Who Defines Futility?, 260 AM. J. MED. ASS’N 2094, 2095 (1988)). 




scientific criteria, though inevitably tempered by the physician’s subjective 
judgment concerning the overall efficacy of the proposed intervention.12 
This apparent dichotomy reflects the full range of factors that bear upon the 
exercise of clinical judgment, although it inevitably blurs the line between 
interventions that are medically indicated and those that would be futile to 
provide under the circumstances.13 
                                                                                                             
 12. CLINICAL ETHICS, supra note 10, at 21. Interventions in these cases are 
sometimes referred to as “not medically indicated.” Id. at 34. In general, 
interventions are “medically indicated” when “the patient’s impaired physical or 
mental condition may be improved by their application.” Id. at 21. The 
contemporary version of the futility debate delves into the scope of the term 
“medically indicated” by asking under what circumstances a physician may 
override a patient’s request for treatment—whether expressed directly or through 
a surrogate—that is non-curative, but nevertheless offers an identifiable, though 
temporary, physiological benefit. See generally id. at 30. In general, the 
underlying principle that governs the physician’s ethical and professional 
responsibilities “are closely tied to their ability to fulfill the goals of medicine in 
conjunction with their respect for patients’ preferences about the goals of their 
lives.” Id. at 14. The various facets of this question can be analyzed in relation 
either to the goals of treatment—to cure the patient’s condition, to mitigate the 
suffering that might be associated with it, or to provide comfort care—or to the 
status of the patient as “dying,” “terminal,” or “incurable.” See generally id. at 
20–26. Any question concerning a physician’s judgment about the clinical 
viability of an intervention would implicate the law of medical malpractice when 
a patient contends that a physician mistakenly concluded that it would have been 
physiologically futile to employ a treatment regimen that, in fact, was a viable 
clinical option. As a matter of law, such presentations of the futility question are 
relatively straightforward in the sense that their resolution turns upon reconciling 
the physician’s conduct with the professional standard of care, which would be 
established with reference to expert testimony. This Article does not focus on 
mistakes in determining whether an intervention is futile in an objectively clinical 
sense, but instead on how the law should define futility in the abstract. See, e.g., 
id. at 44. 
 13. As noted by Professors Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade,  
Given the nature of medical science and the particularities of each 
patient, clinical judgment is never absolutely certain. Clinical medicine 
was described by Dr. William Osler as “a science of uncertainty and an 
art of probability.” The central task of clinicians is to reduce uncertainty 
to the extent possible by using clinical data, medical science, and 
reasoning to reach a diagnosis and propose a plan of care. The process 
by which a clinician attempts to make consistently good decisions in the 
face of uncertainty is called clinical judgment.  
Id. at 26. In light of this “uncertain science” and the “art of probability” that shape 
the exercise of clinical judgment, it has been suggested that physicians tend to reach 
widely divergent conclusions about the effectiveness of clinical interventions. Id. at 




The appropriate placement of that line becomes most uncertain when 
a physician’s clinical judgment incorporates a purely subjective 
assessment concerning patient characteristics that are unrelated to the 
physiological efficacy of an intervention. Such cases, which reflect the 
contemporary focus of the futility question, go beyond the purely objective 
measure of absolute physiological futility to ask under what circumstances 
a physician may override a patient’s request for treatment that is non-
curative but nevertheless offers an identifiable, though merely temporary, 
physiological benefit.14 For example, physicians occasionally withdraw 
nutrition and hydration from permanently unconscious patients after 
concluding that the continuation of treatment would merely and 
indefinitely prolong the patient’s physical existence, but would do so 
without offering any hope for his return to a sapient state.15 In some of 
                                                                                                             
28. These diverse results also have been attributed to the varied levels of clinical 
experience among physicians and the relative scarcity of studies that demonstrate 
meaningful probabilities. Id. Altogether, the resulting vagueness has led some 
clinicians and ethicists to deny futility as a meaningful concept, although others 
consider it useful with respect to interventions that have a low likelihood of 
success. Id. In any event, the contemporary debate about clinical futility focuses 
on the level of statistical evidence that would support a determination of futility, 
whether the patient or the physician should decide that an intervention is futile, 
and what process should be employed to resolve disagreements between patients 
and their physicians concerning those determinations. Id. 
 14. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 15. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). These 
cases might include patients who are in a persistent vegetative state, a state of 
permanent unconsciousness, or another such state of severe incapacity that is 
believed to be irreversible. Patients in a persistent vegetative state generally 
maintain sufficient brain stem function to enable them to “breathe air, digest food, 
and produce urine without assistance.” MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & 
DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 530 (7th ed. 2007). These 
patients tend to experience cycles of sleep in which their eyes are closed, and 
cycles of awakening in which their eyes are open. Id. They might smile, utter 
unintelligible sounds, move their eyes and limbs, though sporadically, and exhibit 
reflexive responses to physical stimuli by grimacing, coughing, or gagging, all of 
which give the appearance of consciousness when there is none. Id. In contrast, 
persons in a coma are in a sleep-like state and exhibit no indications of 
consciousness. See, e.g., id. at 530–31. Many of such patients would be considered 
terminally ill under the customary natural death act, even if their biological life 
could be sustained indefinitely by application of artificial nutrition and hydration, 
and by mechanical ventilation. 




these cases, physicians have withheld treatment unilaterally, openly 
disregarding an authorized surrogate’s order to the contrary.16 
Some physicians would justify such unilateral decisions to withhold 
treatment as the legitimate exercise of medical judgment, and at least one 
court has addressed the issue from that perspective.17 However, it would be 
incoherent to resolve these cases with reference to professional judgment 
unless the physician would also have withheld treatment from otherwise 
similarly situated patients who had a reasonable prospect of regaining 
consciousness.18 Under this view, a custom of unilaterally withholding 
treatment from only permanently unconscious patients would not reflect the 
exercise of professional discretion concerning the efficacy of a procedure that 
a physician reasonably expects to prolong life. Rather, such a custom would 
appear to reflect only the physician’s value judgment concerning the right of 
a severely incapacitated patient to receive treatment.19 
This perspective compels consideration of whether there is something 
different about a patient with a severe cognitive impairment that would qualify 
his right to have a surrogate speak on his behalf after losing capacity. Much 
of the tension in the present debate about medical futility arises more out of a 
conflict of visions concerning that fundamental issue than the respect to be 
accorded the physician’s exercise of medical judgment.20 
Many of the participants in this debate would resolve the futility question 
by relying on the traditional legal and ethical principles that have come to 
define the scope and durability of one’s general right to accept or refuse 
medical treatment at the end of life.21 However, one might question the 
relevance of those principles in the context of a patient who has no reasonable 
prospect of returning to a sapient existence, particularly when a continuation 
of treatment would lead to an extended physical life that may span years rather 
than mere hours or days. With respect to patients in a persistent vegetative 
state, for example, Peter Singer has said:  
                                                                                                             
 16. See, e.g., Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1075–76 (La. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 17. Id. at 1076. 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 1075–76. 
 19. Id. 
 20. According to Professor Meisel, the futility debate might be difficult to 
resolve because it “revolves around fundamentally irresolvable moral conflicts 
concerning our most deeply held beliefs about the value of life.” MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-13 (quoting E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly 
Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 
1994, at 33). 
 21. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170. 




They are not self-conscious, rational, or autonomous, and so 
considerations of a right to life or of respecting autonomy do not 
apply. If they have no experiences at all, and can never have any 
again, their lives have no intrinsic value. Their life’s journey has 
come to an end. They are biologically alive, but not biographically.22  
Adherents to this view would disregard the relevance of principles concerning 
one’s fundamental right to self-determination simply by denying that it should 
be ascribed to permanently unconscious patients.23 
In opposition, there is the idea that any human being is the subject of 
rights and intrinsic value by virtue of what he is by nature, rather than with 
reference to any actual capacities he might possess at any point in time during 
life.24 Those who advocate this view would find it both illogical and unjust to 
define one’s rights with reference to his state of consciousness: 
To base the intrinsic value of a being on an accidental attribute—
such as consciousness or the immediately exercisable capacity for 
consciousness—is to base a radical moral difference on a mere 
quantitative ontological difference. We treat beings who are 
subjects of rights radically differently from the way we treat other 
beings. The basis for that radical difference in treatment must be 
some radical difference in the different types of beings treated 
differently. Between any human being and a corpse or an 
aggregate of tissues and organs there is a radical difference. But 
the difference between a healthy, self-conscious human being and 
                                                                                                             
 22. PATRICK LEE & ROBERT P. GEORGE, BODY-SELF DUALISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS AND POLITICS 152 (2008) (quoting PETER SINGER, 
PRACTICAL ETHICS (3rd. ed. 1993)). Although Singer acknowledges that these 
persons are “biologically alive,” he nevertheless suggests that, for all practical 
purposes, they are not. Id. From a legal perspective, however, Singer’s argument 
is negated by the definition of death. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:111(A) (2016), 
which defines a person’s “death” in these terms: 
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a 
physician, duly licensed in the state of Louisiana based on ordinary 
standards of approved medical practice, the person has experienced an 
irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. 
In the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that 
these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the 
announced opinion of a physician, duly licensed in the state of Louisiana 
based upon ordinary standards of approved medical practice, the person 
has experienced an irreversible total cessation of brain function. 
 23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 24. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 154–55. 




a human being incapacitated, even severely incapacitated, is only a 
difference in degree. It is unjust, then, to pick out such an accidental 
attribute as self-consciousness or the immediately exercisable 
capacity for self-consciousness and make that the criterion for 
whether someone should be treated as a subject of rights or not. 
Thus, a human being is valuable as a subject of rights in virtue of 
what he or she is (a person, a subject with the basic nature capacity 
for conceptual thought and free choice even if he or she cannot right 
now actualize that basic capacity). And so a human being remains 
a subject of rights, someone who has a right not to be intentionally 
killed, for as long as he or she exists.25 
The central premise of this Article is that established principles of both 
law and bioethics that relate to the right of a patient either to accept or 
refuse medical treatment implicitly reflect and rest upon this perspective.26 
Accordingly, the arguments presented here are grounded in the following 
                                                                                                             
 25. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 155. The implications of this “singular” 
view of the human person are profound. Those who see personhood from this 
perspective would have it that the human body is not a mere external tool to be 
used, consumed, or subjected to experimentation for the benefit of others without 
consent. Id. at 82. Rather, they would argue that the human organism, in and of 
itself, has a full moral worth and, as such, is the subject of rights. Id. This view 
would be consistent with that of John Locke, who argued that our lives are 
inalienable because we hold them in trust for God, who truly owns both our lives 
and our liberties. According to Locke, 
[A] man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or 
his own consent . . . put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of 
another, to take away his life, when he pleases. [H]e that cannot take 
away his own life, cannot give another power over it. . . . [T]he 
fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human 
sanction can be good, or valid against it.  
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 284, 358 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). The state’s interest in preserving life 
reflects this premise, by implication if not by design. At the same time, 
however, the principle of autonomy reflects the law’s recognition that liberty 
necessarily entails one’s freedom to make choices that are unique to his or 
her perspective about how to honor that trust. 
 26. Advance directive statutes, by definition, rest on this premise. See 
generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170–81 (discussing 
surrogate decision-making, which rests on the fundamental rule of law that the 
right either to give or refuse consent to treatment survives incapacity, thus leaving 
for resolution only one’s preference under the circumstances). 




specific assumptions.27 First, because biological life is essential and 
intrinsic to human personhood, a person comes into being not later than 
the time of his birth, by which time the human organism itself has been 
identified as a discrete biological entity that is “a whole . . . member of the 
species homo sapiens.”28 Second, a person ceases to exist only when the 
                                                                                                             
 27. These premises also serve as the foundation for the arguments raised by 
the author in a broader work concerning medical futility. See Frederick R. Parker, 
Jr., Law, Bioethics, and Medical Futility: Defining Patient Rights at the End of 
Life, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 185, 190–91 (2015). 
 28. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 122. Professors Lee and George ground 
this reasoning in the science of embryology, from which they conclude “the life 
of an individual human being begins with the joining of sperm and ovum, which 
yields a genetically and functionally distinct organism, possessing the resources 
and active disposition for internally directed development toward human 
maturity.” Id. at 118–19 (citing WILLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY (3rd 
ed. 2001); KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: 
CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY (7th ed. 2003); RONAN R. O’RAHILLY & 
FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY (3rd ed. 2001); 
SCOTT F. GILBERT, DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY (7th ed. 2003)). More specifically, 
they announce “three important points.” Id. at 120. First, they announce that the 
embryo, from its inception, is distinct from any cell of either the father or the 
mother, as reflected in the fact that “[i]ts growth is internally directed to its own 
survival and maturation, a distinct end from the survival and flourishing of the 
mother in whose body this distinct organism resides.” Id. Second, they announce 
that the embryo possesses the genetic composition of a human being. Id. Third, 
they announce that the embryo “is a whole, though obviously immature, human 
being.” Id. Professors Lee and George distinguished the embryo as a separately 
identifiable organism from the gametes whose union brought it into existence by 
noting,  
They are not only genetically but also functionally identifiable as parts 
of the male or female potential parents. Each has only half the genetic 
material needed to guide the development of an immature human toward 
full maturity, and none of these cells will survive long. They clearly are 
destined either to combine with an ovum or sperm or to degenerate. Even 
when they succeed in causing fertilization, they do not survive; rather, 
their genetic (and cytoplasmic) material enters into the composition of a 
distinct, new organism.  
Id. at 120–21. In contrast with the gametes, they state:  
The human embryo, from beginning of fertilization onward, is fully 
programmed actively to develop himself or herself to the mature stage 
of a human being. And unless deprived of a suitable environment or 
prevented by accident or disease, this embryo will actively develop itself 
in its own distinct direction, toward its own survival and maturity. The 
direction of its growth is not extrinsically deter-mined, but is in accord 
with the genetic information and cytoplasmic factors within it. The 




biological function of the human body is extinguished by death.29 Third, every 
human person is, by definition, indistinguishable from his or her body, both 
the person and the bodily organism constituting but one and the same entity.30 
Accordingly, a human person is a particular form of physical organism that 
integrates into one uniquely identifiable being both biological life and the 
kinds of things that persons, by nature, have the capacity to do.31 The person 
is an “embodied mind” or a “living bodily entity” rather than a consciousness 
that possesses or inhabits a body, or a series of conscious experiences.32 In 
short, one’s self, or person, is so inextricably identified with the human 
physical organism that we are essentially bodily beings.33 Finally, every 
human being is intrinsically valuable as a bearer of rights by virtue of what he 
or she is.34 Just as no human being can come to be and later acquire intrinsic 
                                                                                                             
human embryo is, then, a whole (though immature) and distinct human 
organism—a human being.  
Id. at 121. 
 29. The opposing perspective is radically different. LEE & GEORGE, supra 
note 22, at 130–32. If a biological aspect of human life, such as consciousness, is 
considered to be a merely extrinsic characteristic we ascribe to the human person, 
it might be said that a person does not come into existence until the organism 
begins to manifest those characteristics. Id. Further, this “dualism” view would 
consider the human “person” and the human “organism” as distinct entities such 
that the human person ceases to exist when the organism no longer manifests the 
characteristics that are uniquely identified with personhood, even if the biological 
organism itself is not yet dead. Id. This perspective, therefore, would assume that 
a “person” is in some manner distinct from the bodily organism with which he or 
she is identified. Many who advocate for a right to euthanasia would consider an 
individual who is permanently unconscious as having ceased to exist as a human 
person even though the same biological organism with which they “previously 
were associated” continues to exist. Id. at 151–52. Thus, while they would agree 
that it is wrong to kill a person, they claim that it is not necessarily wrong to kill 
a human being who is not a person. Id. 
 30. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 130–32. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 132. 
 34. Professor Budziszewski relates the logic of attributing intrinsic value to 
all human beings: 
To be a person is to be a proper subject of absolute regard—a “neighbor” 
in the sense of the Commandments—a being of the sort whom the 
Commandments are about. It is persons whom I am not to kill, persons 
whom I am to love as I love myself. But what is a person? If we accept 
the biblical revelation that man is the imago Dei, the image of God, then 
every human being is a person—a person by nature, a kind of thing 
different from any other kind, a being whose very existence is a kind of 




                                                                                                             
sacrament, a sign of God’s grace. Trying to understand man without 
recognizing him as the imago Dei is like trying to understand a bas-relief 
without recognizing it as a carving. . . . In contemporary secular ethics, 
the ruling tendency is to concede that there are such things as persons, 
but to define them in terms of their functions or capacities—not by what 
they are, . . . but by what they can do. . . . To give but a single well-
known illustration, philosopher Mary Ann Warren defines “person-
hood” in terms of consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the 
capacity to communicate about indefinitely many topics, and conceptual 
self-awareness. If you can do all those things, you’re a person; if you 
can’t, you’re not. The functional approach to personhood seems 
plausible at first, just because—at a certain stage of development, and 
barring misfortune—most persons do have those functions. But Warren 
thinks persons are their functions . . . . [U]nborn babies are not capable 
of reasoning, complex communication, and so on. . . . If unborn babies 
may be killed because they lack these functions, then a great many other 
individuals may also be killed for the same reasons—for example the 
asleep, unconscious, demented, addicted, and very young, not to mention 
sundry other cases such as deaf-mutes who have not been taught sign 
language. . . . [We need] to stop confusing what persons are with what 
they can typically do. . . . [A functional definition is] appropriate for 
things that have no inherent nature, whose identity is dependent on our 
purposes and interests—things which do not intrinsically deserve to be 
regarded in a certain way, but which may be regarded in any way which 
is convenient. For example, suppose I am building an automobile and I 
need to keep two moving parts from touching each other. . . . Anything 
can be a spacer which fills the space . . . . The particular lump of matter 
I use to accomplish this purpose is not intrinsically a proper subject of 
absolute regard; my regard for it—even its very identity as a spacer—is 
relative to how I want to use it, or to what I find interesting about it. By 
contrast, if I am a person, then I am by nature a rights-bearer, by nature 
a proper subject of absolute regard—not because of what I can do, but 
because of what I am. Of course this presupposes that I have a nature, a 
“what-I-am”, which is distinct from the present condition or stage of 
development of what I am, distinct from my abilities in that condition or 
stage of development, and, in particular, distinct from how this 
condition, stage of development, or set of abilities might happen to be 
valued by other people. In short, a person is by nature someone whom it 
is wrong to view merely functionally—wrong to value merely as a means 
to the ends or the interests of others. If you regard me as a person only 
because I am able to exercise certain capacities that interest you, then 
you are saying that I am an object of your regard not in absolute but only 
in a relative sense. . . . And so the functional definition of personhood 
does not even rise to the dignity of being wrong.  
J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN’T NOT KNOW 70–72 (2003).  




value, no human being can continue to be, but lose the intrinsic value imputed 
to him or her as a subject of rights.35 
These premises are consistent with the longstanding recognition in 
American law that a patient’s right to express either an informed consent or a 
knowing refusal of treatment is not conditioned upon a finding of decisional 
capacity—to the contrary, that right both arises and is extinguished with the 
patient’s life.36 
II. DEFINING MEDICAL FUTILITY WITH REFERENCE TO THE ACT 
The law concerning end-of-life decisions in the United States arose over 
the past four decades as advances in medical technology enabled physicians 
to sustain metabolic life well beyond the customary barriers of time and 
physics by providing artificial means of respiration, circulation, nutrition, and 
hydration.37 These interventions soon became problematic for physicians and 
hospitals when surrogates for patients who were believed to be permanently 
unconscious began to refuse treatment that offered an opportunity to extend 
biological life indefinitely, though without any expectation that the patient 
would return to a sapient state.38 
When physicians expressed their hesitance to withhold or withdraw 
treatment from such patients because of concerns about potentially adverse 
legal and professional consequences, patient surrogates initiated legal 
proceedings in which they sought judicial sanction.39 Out of these cases arose 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. 
 36. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985) (“The right of an adult 
who, like Claire Conroy, was once competent, to determine the course of her 
medical treatment remains intact even when she is no longer able to assert that 
right or to appreciate its effectuation.”); see generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, 
supra note 1, at 170. 
 37. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270, 270 n.3 
(1990). According to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Cruzan:  
Medical technology . . . is often capable of resuscitating people after they 
have stopped breathing or their hearts have stopped beating. Some of those 
people are brought fully back to life. Two decades ago, those who were not 
and could not swallow and digest food, died. Intravenous solutions could 
not provide sufficient calories to maintain people for more than a short time. 
Today, various forms of artificial feeding have been developed that are able 
to keep people metabolically alive for years, even decades. 
 Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 38. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Conroy, 486 A.2d 
1209; Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. 
 39. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647; Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; Cruzan, 497 
U.S. 261. 




a fairly consistent body of jurisprudence that recognized one’s general right 
to forego life-sustaining treatment.40 This right traditionally has been 
understood as the natural corollary to the doctrine of informed consent: if a 
physician is obligated to obtain a patient’s consent prior to providing 
treatment, the clear inference is that the patient has a corresponding right to 
refuse treatment.41 
The jurisprudence42 eventually culminated in legislative responses in the 
various states along the lines of the Act.43 Although these statutory schemes 
vary somewhat from one state to another,44 they tend to embody two key 
elements: first, they expressly recognize one’s right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment in certain narrowly defined circumstances; and second, they provide 
immunity from liability for physicians who act in accordance with their 
patients’ decisions to withhold or withdraw such measures.45 
As a natural implication of the doctrine of informed consent, the 
recognition of such a right is well-grounded in American law, and one’s 
refusal of treatment generally is not controversial. It becomes problematic 
from a legal perspective, however, when the refusal relates to treatment that 
would either prevent the patient’s death or, if death is inevitable, extend his 
life. This is so because a refusal of treatment in either of those cases would 
bring the patient’s interest in self-determination into conflict with the state’s 
                                                                                                             
 40. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. 
 41. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (“Anglo-
American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It 
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if 
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, 
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form 
of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute 
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.”). 
 42. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 2-3. Although 
many of the early cases arose in the context of competent persons who objected 
to treatment either on religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal 
preference, the rapid emergence of advanced medical technology since the 1970s 
provided the main impetus for the modern so-called “right-to-die” cases. Cruzan, 
497 U.S. at 270. Such technology has enabled biological life to be sustained 
almost indefinitely by a combination of devices for artificial respiration, 
circulation, feeding, and hydration. See id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 43. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1 (2016). 
 44. See generally UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1993); UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989). 
 45. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-16–7-20. 




broader interests in preserving life,46 preventing suicide,47 preserving the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession,48 and protecting members of 
vulnerable groups.49  
                                                                                                             
 46. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239 (N.J. 1985). Some 
commentators have observed that the predominant jurisprudential trend is to view 
the state’s specific interest in preserving the life of a particular individual as 
dependent on that individual’s interest in preserving his own life, and that most 
courts seem to have abandoned any effort to balance the individual’s right to 
refuse treatment with the state’s interest in preserving life. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 531. The United States Supreme Court noted in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, however, in the context of terminally ill patients who sought the 
active assistance of a physician in bringing about their death that the states “may 
properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular 
individual may enjoy,” and “[t]his remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for 
those who are near death.” 521 U.S. 702, 729–30 (1997) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 
at 282). Without regard to the perceived momentum of the states toward 
qualifying their interests in preserving life or otherwise in practice narrowing the 
circumstances in which they might exercise it, that fact would not bear upon the 
issue when the patient has affirmatively requested treatment. Meisel has 
summarized the general judicial consensus concerning this right as follows: first, 
patients, whether competent or incompetent, have both a common law and a 
constitutional law right to refuse treatment. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, 
supra note 1, at 2-5. Second, the state’s interest in opposing a competent patient’s 
right to forgo life-sustaining treatment is “virtually nonexistent,” and the state’s 
interest is “very weak” with respect to incompetent patients who have a dim 
prognosis for recovery, although the state likely would not disavow that interest 
if the patient has chosen not to exercise his right to refuse treatment. Id. As noted 
by Professor Meisel, “the right of self-determination has . . . traditionally been 
thought to require that treatment not be forgone without the informed consent of 
one legally authorized to provide it.” Id. at 2-25. Third, decisions about life-
sustaining treatment generally should take place in the clinical setting, although 
the courts are available to resolve disputes about those decisions. Id. Fourth, 
surrogate decision makers for incompetent patients should express the patient’s 
own preferences to the extent made known prior to the loss of capacity, and to the 
extent the patient’s preference is unknown, decisions should be made on the basis 
of the patient’s best interests. Id. Fifth, physicians and surrogates may rely on an 
incompetent patient’s advance directive in ascertaining the patient’s preferences 
concerning life-sustaining procedures. Id. Sixth, artificial nutrition and hydration 
is a form of medical treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn under the same 
conditions as other forms of medical treatment. Id. Seventh, the withholding or 
withdrawal of medical treatment is both morally and ethically distinct from 
euthanasia and assisted suicide, assuming that the patient has agreed to withhold 
or withdraw treatment. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223. 
 48. Id. 




Although the Act represents the legislature’s effort to balance these 
competing interests, the statute itself reflects the inherent difficulty of 
fulfilling that purpose. For example, the Act acknowledges in broad, 
general terms that patients have a fundamental right to control decisions 
relating to their medical care, and that this right encompasses the refusal 
of life-sustaining clinical interventions.50 However, the law is vague in 
terms of defining the ultimate scope of this liberty, expressly recognizing 
only the right of terminally ill patients to refuse treatment that would 
merely postpone the moment of death, and leaving open the question of 
one’s right to withhold or withdraw other forms of treatment that offer a 
reasonable prospect of reversing the dying process.51 Moreover, and in a 
                                                                                                             
 49. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 273 (1990). 
 50. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A) (2016) provides:  
(1) The legislature finds that all persons have the fundamental right to 
control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including the 
decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in 
instances where such persons are diagnosed as having a terminal and 
irreversible condition. (2) The legislature further finds that the artificial 
prolongation of life for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and 
irreversible condition may cause loss of individual and personal dignity 
and secure only a precarious and burdensome existence while providing 
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the person . . . . (4) In 
furtherance of the rights of such persons, the legislature finds and 
declares that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to be the 
exclusive means by which life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or 
withdrawn, nor shall this Subpart be construed to require the application 
of medically inappropriate treatment or life-sustaining procedures to any 
patient or to interfere with medical judgment with respect to the 
application of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures. 
 51. The Act, for example, expressly provides that a patient who has been 
diagnosed as having a “terminal and irreversible condition” has the right to 
withhold or withdraw “life-sustaining procedure[s],” which by definition serve 
only to prolong the dying process. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(8), (14). The 1989 
version of The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act is similarly limited to 
“treatment that is merely life-prolonging, and to patients whose terminal condition 
is incurable and irreversible, whose death will soon occur, and who are unable to 
participate in treatment decisions.” UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 
prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989). According to Meisel, “several” states 
have adopted the URTIA in either its 1985 or 1989 version. MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-54–7-55. Other statutory schemes, however, are 
broader in scope. For example, the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 
“acknowledges the right of a competent individual to decide all aspects of his or 
her own health care in all circumstances, including the right to decline health care 
or to direct that health care be discontinued, even if death ensues. . . . The Act 




manner consistent with the state’s interest in preserving life, the Act 
expressly states that one’s right to refuse treatment is a voluntary matter 
that rests solely within the patient’s discretion.52 In this manner, the statute 
establishes that the law does not authorize, nor does it require, the 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment in any particular case absent the 
patient’s consent.53 Likewise, the law provides that it is not to be construed 
as authorizing or condoning euthanasia.54 Taken together, it might be fair 
to say that these provisions suggest a legislative intent to affirm and retain 
the state’s traditional interest in preserving life when the patient has not 
exercised his right to refuse treatment. 
To give practical effect to the patient’s right of self-determination and 
to encourage physicians to respect patient preferences, the statute 
incorporates an immunity provision that insulates physicians from liability 
when they withhold or withdraw treatment in accordance with their 
                                                                                                             
recognizes and validates an individual’s authority to define the scope of an 
instruction or agency as broadly or as narrowly as the individual chooses.” UNIF. 
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993). 
According to the Uniform Law Commission’s Legislative Fact Sheet, the UHCDA 
had been adopted by Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, 
and Wyoming as of 2014, although the advance directive statutes of some states 
appear to be modified forms of the UHCDA. Legislative Fact Sheet–Health-Care 
Decisions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislative 
FactSheet.aspx?title=Health-Care%20Decisions%20Act [https://perma.cc/3LWA-
5NAV] (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 
1, at 7-32–7-33, 7-63–7-89 (summarizing the law in this regard in other jurisdictions). 
Notwithstanding the narrow scope of this statutory right, however, the Louisiana 
statute, like similar schemes in other jurisdictions, expressly states that its provisions 
are “cumulative with existing law.” See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(C). According 
to Meisel, these schemes “are intended to preserve and supplement existing common 
law and constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit them.” See MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-33–7-34. 
 52. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(1) & (2). 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B) provides:  
(1) The legislature intends that the provisions of this Subpart are 
permissive and voluntary. The legislature further intends that the making 
of a declaration pursuant to this Subpart merely illustrates a means of 
documenting a patient’s decision relative to withholding or withdrawal 
of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures. (2) It is the intent of 
the legislature that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to require 
the making of a declaration pursuant to this Subpart. 
 54. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(A). See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra 
note 1, at 7-102–7-103.  




patients’ wishes.55 Finally, the statute expressly denies any intent to 
interfere with the exercise of “medical judgment”56 or to require the 
provision of “medically inappropriate treatment.”57 These core provisions 
of the Act directly shape both patient rights and physician obligations 
during the course of the physician–patient relationship. 
Although the legislature adopted the Act to recognize and further the 
right of individuals to control decisions related to their medical care, 
physicians occasionally have relied upon the statute not only to justify 
their acquiescence to a patient’s decision to refuse treatment, but also to 
substantiate their own decisions to deny treatment that a patient or his 
authorized surrogate has expressly requested.58 
Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center59 is an interesting example of 
such a case. Sonya Causey, a 31-year-old quadriplegic who was comatose 
and suffering from end-stage renal disease, was totally dependent on a 
ventilator, regular hemodialysis, and the continuous provision of artificial 
nutrition and hydration.60 These interventions constituted “life-sustaining 
procedures” as defined in the Act, which expressly recognized the 
authority of Sonya’s surrogate decision maker to refuse treatment on her 
behalf.61 
Although Sonya’s attending physician believed that continued 
treatment could preserve her life for at least two additional years, he was 
                                                                                                             
 55. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7(A)(1), (C)(1); see also id. § 
40:1151.8(B) (subjecting to criminal prosecution any persons who act in various 
ways to cause the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment contrary 
to the patient’s wishes). For similar immunity schemes in other jurisdictions see 
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, § 9 and UNIF. HEALTH-CARE 
DECISIONS ACT, § 9. According to Meisel, “statutes do not confer wholesale 
immunity; rather, most confer qualified immunity conditioned on the physician’s 
acting in good faith and pursuant to reasonable medical standards.” MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-149. 
 56. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(3). 
 57. Id. In contrast with the language of the Act, the UHCDA does not require 
the provision of treatment that would be “medically ineffective.” UNIF. HEALTH-
CARE DECISIONS ACT, §§ 7(f), 13(d) (the comments to which define “medically 
ineffective” as “treatment which would not offer . . . any significant benefit,” or 
treatment that would be “contrary to generally accepted health-care standards”). 
The URTIA similarly does not require the provision of treatment that would be 
“contrary to reasonable medical standards.” UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY 
ILL ACT, § 11(f). 
 58. See Pope, supra note 5. 
 59. 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
 60. Id. at 1073, 1075–76. 
 61. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(8). 




of the opinion that Sonya had an insignificant chance of ever regaining 
consciousness.62 He therefore recommended that treatment be withdrawn 
and that Sonya be allowed to die.63 When her family insisted that treatment 
be continued, the physician presented the case to the hospital’s Morals and 
Ethics Board, which concurred with his recommendation.64 Treatment was 
then withdrawn over the strong objection of Sonya’s family, and she died 
shortly thereafter.65  
In response to this action, members of Sonya’s family initiated a legal 
proceeding in which they sought damages from the physician and the 
hospital under the theory that they had committed an intentional tort in the 
form of a battery.66 However, the trial court concluded that the case was 
grounded in medical malpractice because the physician’s actions reflected 
his “professional opinions and professional judgment.”67 The court thus 
determined that the case was subject to the Medical Malpractice Act,68 
which required that it be submitted for consideration by a medical review 
panel before judicial proceedings were initiated.69 The trial court then 
dismissed the action as premature from a procedural perspective.70 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision.71 As 
the case concerned the legal consequences of withdrawing life-sustaining 
                                                                                                             
 62. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1073. 
 63. Id. at 1074. 
 64. Id. The hospital had in place a “Futile Care Policy” that provided for 
treatment to be discontinued if it had only a slight probability of improving the 
patient’s condition. Id. at 1075. 
 65. Id. at 1074. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1073. 
 68. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.1 (2016). 
 69. Id. Louisiana conditions the jurisdiction of the courts in actions grounded 
in medical malpractice and informed consent law upon the case first having been 
submitted for review by a Medical Review Panel. See id. § 41:1231.8(A)(1)(a)–
(B)(1)(a). The Medical Practice Act defines “malpractice” as “any unintentional 
tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services 
rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a 
patient.” Id. § 40:1231.1(A)(13). “Health care means any act or treatment 
performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by 
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient.” Id. § 40:1231.1(A)(9). 
A physician’s failure to obtain either a patient’s informed consent or refusal for 
treatment would constitute such a claim, and thus would be subject to the medical 
review panel process. See id. § 40:1157.1(D). 
 70. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1073. 
 71. Id. at 1076. 




treatment, the court logically began its analysis with reference to the Act.72 
Noting that the legislature had grounded its recognition of that right in the 
concepts of patient autonomy, self-determination, and informed consent,73 
the court pointed out that the facts of Causey were diametrically opposed 
to those of the customary end-of-life dispute, in which physicians were 
reluctant to accede to a surrogate’s request that treatment be withdrawn 
and the patient be allowed to die.74 In Causey, the court said, “the roles are 
reversed”: 
Patients or, if incompetent, their surrogate decision-makers, are 
demanding life-sustaining treatment regardless of its perceived 
futility, while physicians are objecting to being compelled to 
prolong life with procedures they consider futile. The right or 
autonomy of the patient to refuse treatment is simply a severing 
of the relationship with the physician. In this case, however, the 
patient (through her surrogate) is not severing a relationship, but 
demanding treatment the physician believes is “inappropriate.” 
The problem is not with care that the physician believes is harmful 
or literally has no effect. For example, radiation treatment for Mrs. 
Causey’s condition would not have been appropriate. This is 
arguably based on medical science. Rather, the problem is with 
care that has an effect on the dying process, but which the 
physician believes has no benefit. Such life-prolonging care is 
grounded in beliefs and values about which people disagree. 
Strictly speaking, if a physician can keep the patient alive, such 
care is not medically or physiologically “futile;” however, it may 
be “futile” on philosophical, religious or practical grounds.75 
Finding the issue of futility to be “a subjective and nebulous concept 
which, except in the strictest physiological sense, incorporates value 
judgments,” and concluding that it would be “confusing” and “generate[] 
polemical discussion” to focus on that concept, the court “turn[ed] instead 
to an approach emphasizing the standard of medical care.”76 In doing so, 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. at 1074. 
 73. Id. (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 
(1976)). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1075. The Causey court set the framework for its opinion on the 
professional standard of care with an inferential reference to the doctrine of 
informed consent, noting that “[t]he physician has an obligation to present all 
medically acceptable treatment options for the patient or her surrogate to consider 
and either choose or reject; however, this does not compel a physician to provide 




the court focused on the physician’s professional obligations as described 
in the Act, which provides: 
In furtherance of the rights of [terminally ill] persons, the legislature 
finds and declares that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to 
be the exclusive means by which life-sustaining procedures may be 
withheld or withdrawn, nor shall this Subpart be construed to 
require the application of medically inappropriate treatment or life-
sustaining procedures to any patient or to interfere with medical 
judgment with respect to the application of medical treatment or 
life-sustaining procedures.77 
The court then concluded that “[a] finding that treatment is ‘medically 
inappropriate’ by a consensus of physicians practicing in that specialty 
translates into a standard of care”78 and affirmed the trial court’s decision 
that the plaintiff’s claim should have been considered by a medical review 
panel before litigation was initiated.79 
It is not surprising that the court sought to evade the issue of medical 
futility, particularly in light of the widely acknowledged difficulty of 
                                                                                                             
interventions that in his view would be harmful, without effect or ‘medically 
inappropriate.’” Id. 
 77. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 78. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1076. 
 79. Id. There also was evidence that the physician based his defense, at least 
in part, on his opinion that continued treatment would have been “medically 
inappropriate” because he considered it to be inhumane. Id. at 1076 n.3. That fact 
arguably would raise only the question of whether the patient would have given 
consent to continuation of the treatment at issue. It is interesting to note that 
Causey arose after treatment had been withdrawn and the patient had died. Id. at 
1073. Had the defendants sought judicial sanction for the withdrawal of treatment 
prior to acting, it is difficult to envision the court referring the case to a medical 
review panel. Rather, one might expect the case to have received an expedited 
judicial review to address the issue of whether the patient would have refused 
continued treatment under the particular circumstances of the case. Although 
resolution of that question might have required the same sort of expert testimony 
that would inform the opinion of a medical review panel concerning whether the 
patient suffered from a “terminal and irreversible condition,” and whether the 
treatment at issue was a “life-sustaining procedure,” the ultimate issue would 
focus on determining whether the patient would have given consent to continued 
treatment if she were capable of expressing a reasoned decision on the matter. 
That said, it is interesting to consider how the court might have approached the 
issue had it been raised prospectively, rather than after the fact.  




defining that concept in the abstract.80 However, a careful analysis of the 
Act reveals that the court improperly invoked the Medical Malpractice Act 
as the appropriate procedural reference point for resolving the case. More 
specifically, the court’s error arose out of its conclusion that the 
physician’s decision to withdraw treatment was grounded in the sort of 
“medical judgment” with which the Act was intended not to interfere.81 
By shifting its focus to the Medical Malpractice Act, the court in effect 
adopted the professional standard of care to resolve an issue that the Act 
would have addressed with reference to the patient’s subjective 
preference.82 
                                                                                                             
 80. It is not surprising that the court sought an opportunity to demur in a case 
such as this, which the courts have long considered to be more appropriately 
within the realm of the legislature. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 407–08 
(N.J. 1987) (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985)) (“We 
recognize, as we did in Conroy, and as have numerous other courts, that given the 
fundamental societal questions that must be resolved, the Legislature is the proper 
branch of government to set guidelines in this area[.] ‘Because the issue with all 
its ramifications is fraught with complexity and encompasses the interests of the 
law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which 
is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type [of] 
issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding 
can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions and 
disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can the subject 
be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and individuals 
be properly accommodated.’”); see also Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 
833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“The issues presented are profound and 
universal in application. They warrant thoughtful study and debate not in the 
context of overheated rhetoric in the battlefield of active litigation, . . . but in 
thoughtful consideration by the Legislature as well as Executive agencies and 
Commissions charged with developing the policies that impact on the lives of 
all.”). 
 81. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075. 
 82. According to the Medical Malpractice Act, “the standard of care required 
of every health care provider . . . in rendering professional services or health care 
to a patient, shall be to exercise that degree of skill ordinarily employed, under 
similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in good standing in the 
same community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with 
his best judgment, in the application of his skill.” LA. REV. STAT. § 
40:1231.1(A)(22).  




A. The Role of “Medical Judgment” in the Act and the Relationship 
Between “Medically Inappropriate Treatment” and “Medical Futility” 
Contrary to the court’s demurrer in Causey, a reasonable argument can 
be made that the Act provides a meaningful reference point for reducing 
the admittedly abstract philosophical notion of medical futility to a 
workable legal standard. This argument is primarily grounded in a reading 
of the statute in the context of its original purpose. More specifically, it 
reflects the logical correlation between the concept of medical futility, the 
state’s interest in the preservation of life, and the limited extent to which the 
Act recognized the patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment. Just 
as the statute establishes an objective threshold for defining a patient’s 
unqualified right to refuse treatment, but without establishing the ultimate 
scope of that right in the abstract, it likewise establishes the objective point 
at which treatment becomes so “futile” that a physician has no obligation to 
provide it, though without identifying the outside boundary of that duty. 
Contemporary questions of medical futility tend to arise when 
surrogates for patients who suffer from a “terminal and irreversible 
condition” affirmatively request forms of treatment that would be classified 
as “life-sustaining procedures” under the Act.83 Such interventions, by 
definition, will not reverse the dying process brought about by the patient’s 
underlying condition; rather, they will only postpone the moment of an 
inevitable, though not necessarily impending, death. Futility issues are most 
commonly encountered in the context of patients like Sonya Causey who 
are believed to be permanently unconscious and whose lives might be 
extended indefinitely through the use of clinical interventions such as 
mechanical ventilation and the artificial administration of nutrition and 
hydration.84 These questions directly implicate the law of informed consent 
                                                                                                             
 83. The Act defines a “life-sustaining procedure” as “any medical procedure 
or intervention which, within reasonable medical judgment, would serve only to 
prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and 
irreversible condition, including such procedures as the invasive administration 
of nutrition and hydration and the administration of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation.” Id. § 40:1151.1(A)(8). A “terminal and irreversible condition” is 
defined as “a continual profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of 
recovery or a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, within 
reasonable medical judgment, would produce death and for which the application 
of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of death.” 
Id. § 40:1151.1(A)(14). 
 84. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1073. 




and the patient’s correlative right to refuse treatment,85 as well as the state’s 
recognized interest in the preservation of life. 
As noted by the Second Circuit in Causey, the Act expressly disavows 
any intention to interfere with the exercise of “medical judgement” or to 
require that physicians provide “life-sustaining procedures” or treatment 
that otherwise would be “medically inappropriate.”86 The court’s decision 
to invoke the medical review panel process thus appears to rest on a 
perceived link between the physician’s exercise of “medical judgment” 
and his conclusion that it would have been “medically inappropriate” to 
continue treatment under the circumstances.87 
Although questions about the clinical propriety of a treatment protocol 
inevitably bear upon the physician’s exercise of “medical judgment,” not all 
determinations made by a physician in the course of the treatment 
relationship necessarily fall within the scope of that term as it is employed 
in the Act. This point is most apparent when a physician grounds a decision 
to withdraw treatment based upon a subjective value judgment about certain 
patient characteristics rather than a professional conclusion based on 
medical expertise. It would be incoherent, for example, to argue that a 
decision to withdraw treatment from a patient believed to permanently lack 
decisional capacity is based on the physician’s exercise of “medical 
judgment” unless he also would withdraw treatment from a similarly 
situated patient who has a reasonable prospect of returning to a sapient state. 
Moreover, a reasonable argument can be made that the Act does not 
employ the term “medically inappropriate treatment” in a manner that 
necessarily calls into question the professional standard of care that applies 
under the Medical Malpractice Act.88 Rather, the meaning of that term as 
                                                                                                             
 85. The right of self-determination traditionally is understood as requiring the 
patient’s consent before treatment is either withheld or withdrawn. See, e.g., 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 2-25 & n.107. As a practical matter, it is 
arguable that these cases are unlikely to be raised on the basis that the patient did 
not give an informed consent because the patient would either have known, or 
should have known, the risk or, more accurately, the certainty that accompanies 
the withholding or withdrawal of treatment necessary to sustain life.  
 86. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075. 
 87. Id. 
 88. As noted above, the Causey court demurred on the substantive issue 
posed by the facts of that case by employing the procedural rules of the Medical 
Malpractice Act to deny jurisdiction pending a consideration of the case by a 
medical review panel. Id. at 1076. Louisiana Revised Statute section 
40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) provides that “[a]ll malpractice claims against health care 
providers covered by this Part . . . shall be reviewed by a medical review panel.” 
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a). Section 40:1231.8(B)(1)(a)(i) provides that 
“[n]o action against a health care provider . . . may be commenced in any court 




                                                                                                             
before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review 
panel.” Id. § 40:1231.8(B)(1)(a)(i). Section 40:1231.1(A)(13) defines “malpractice” 
as “any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or 
professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health 
care provider, to a patient.” Id. § 40:1231(A)(13). Cases concerning the scope of 
the Medical Malpractice Act, however, suggest that it would have been inapposite 
to Causey because it involved the sort of intentional tort not subject to the Act. 
See, e.g., Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 1992) (noting that 
the Medical Malpractice Act’s limitation on the liability of a health care provider 
is a form of special legislation that is “in derogation of the rights of tort victims,” 
that the Act should be strictly construed and thus limited to cases of malpractice 
as expressly defined in the statute, and that “[a]ny other liability of the health care 
provider to the patient is not subject to these limitations”); Coleman v. Deno, 813 
So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002) (“[E]ven though all medical malpractice claims 
[subject to the medical review panel process] are personal injury claims, ‘the 
opposite is not true: every personal injury claim is not a medical malpractice 
claim.’”) (quoting Scott E. Hamm, Note, Power v. Arlington Hospital: A Federal 
Court End Run Around State Malpractice Limitations, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 335, 347–
48 (1993)); id. at 315–16 (setting forth a six-factor test to determine whether a 
physician’s intentional tort is subject to the Medical Malpractice Act, one of 
which is whether expert testimony is required in order to establish a physician’s 
breach of duty); Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1233 (La. 1994) (“[T]here 
are situations in which expert testimony is not necessary [to establish a 
physician’s breach of his professional obligations to a patient]. Expert testimony 
is not required where the physician does an obviously careless act.”); Hastings v. 
Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 448 So. 2d 713, 719 (La. 1987); Lagasse v. Tenet Health 
Sys. Mem’l Med. Ctr. Inc., 83 So. 3d 70, 72 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that an 
allegation of euthanasia is an intentional tort that is not covered by the Medical 
Malpractice Act and, thus, need not be presented to a medical review panel prior 
to initiating legal action for a judicial remedy). In the context of medical 
malpractice, the issue of futility would go to a physician’s erroneous conclusion 
about the efficacy of a particular treatment protocol, either because of an error in 
the underlying diagnosis or concerning the efficacy of the regimen to improve the 
patient’s condition. Absent any such error, it is arguable that a physician who 
concludes that he has no obligation to honor a patient’s request for a particular 
treatment regimen that would be expected to extend life would not be liable for 
malpractice when he refuses to provide it, but for an intentional tort that is not 
subject to the medical review panel process. The Medical Malpractice Act would, 
however, apply to medical determinations concerning whether a patient suffers 
from a “terminal and irreversible condition” or whether a proposed clinical 
intervention constitutes a “life-sustaining procedure.” The facts recited in Causey, 
however, do not indicate that such issues were raised. 




employed in the Act should be informed primarily by the statute’s intended 
purpose of ensuring respect for the individual’s right of self-determination 
while maintaining the integrity of the state’s interest in preserving life.89 
B. The Sole Purpose of the Act was to Ensure Respect for the Patient’s 
Preference Without Compromising the State’s Interest in Preserving Life 
The Act was enacted with the singular purpose of giving effect to the 
patient’s right to control decisions relating to his own medical care at the 
end of life.90 Because this right is not conditioned on one’s decisional 
capacity, the Act also recognizes the authority of a surrogate to refuse 
treatment on behalf of a patient who did not express his wishes while 
capable of doing so.91 Finally, a prospective refusal of treatment by a 
capable person will survive a subsequent loss of capacity.92 Thus, the 
statute reflects the legislative intent that the right to refuse treatment is a 
matter that rests solely within the patient’s discretion and without regard 
                                                                                                             
 89. Reason suggests that the state’s interest in the integrity of the medical 
profession is merely an extension of the state’s broader interest in the preservation 
of life. Viewed from that perspective, one might say that when we talk about the 
discretion of physicians in end-of-life care, we really are talking about them as 
the point persons in giving effect to the state’s interest in preserving life as 
reflected in various provisions of the Act. It is important to focus on the fact that 
this is not a question of the physician’s interest versus the patient’s interest, but 
the state’s interest versus the patient’s interest that the Act was intended to balance 
and the Act’s increasing significance in light of financial constraints. Causey must 
be viewed in that light. 
 90. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(1). More specifically, the statute 
recognizes the right of terminally ill patients to refuse treatment that, by 
definition, would serve only to postpone the moment of death. See id. § 
40:1151(A); id. § 40:1151.1(8) (defining the “life-sustaining procedures” to 
which the Act applies); id. § 40:1151.1(14) (defining a “terminal and irreversible 
condition” upon a finding of which application of the statute depends); id. § 
40:1151.1(11) (defining a “qualified patient” on behalf of whom the statute 
authorizes a declaration to be made by a surrogate). Read together, these 
provisions indicate that the statute does not apply to any form of treatment that 
would reverse a patient’s terminal condition, although the statute expressly 
incorporates one’s right to refuse treatment under general principles of law. See 
id. § 1151.9(C) (providing that the provisions of the Act “are cumulative with 
existing law pertaining to an individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to 
medical or surgical treatment”). Thus, the legislature did not intend to limit the 
existence of a patient’s right to the narrow circumstances described in the statute, 
but merely to limit its express recognition of the right to these most obvious cases. 
 91. Id. § 40:1151.4(A). 
 92. Id. § 40:1151.2(A). 




to whether the patient refuses treatment directly or indirectly through a 
surrogate who speaks on his behalf. 
The statute reflects this emphasis on the patient’s will in several ways. 
For example, it declares that “all persons have the fundamental right to 
control decisions relating to their own medical care,”93 that this right is 
“permissive and voluntary,”94 and that the Act is not to be construed to 
require any patient to make a declaration concerning the refusal of 
treatment.95 Moreover, although the Act does not require patients to 
declare their intentions concerning life-sustaining treatment in any 
particular form, the statute sets forth an illustrative model that expressly 
invites them not to give consent to the withholding or withdrawal of 
treatment should they lack capacity when a decision becomes necessary.96 
Contrary to these express provisions of the statute, the court’s analysis in 
Causey would subject the patient’s right not to refuse treatment to the 
consent of his physician. 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. § 40:1151(A)(1). 
 94. Id. § 40:1151(A)(1), (B)(1)–(2). 
 95. Id. § 40:1151(B)(2). 
 96. 2005 La. Acts 2134. A patient’s declaration concerning life-sustaining 
procedures may be in the following illustrative form: 
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease or illness, or be 
in a continual profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of 
recovery, certified to be a terminal and irreversible by two physicians 
who have personally examined me, one of whom shall be my attending 
physician, and the physicians have determined that my death will occur 
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized and where the 
application of life-sustaining procedure would serve only to prolong 
artificially the dying process, I direct (initial one only): 
__That all life-sustaining procedures, including nutrition and hydration, 
be withheld or withdrawn so that food and water will not be administered 
invasively. 
__That life-sustaining procedures, except nutrition and hydration, be 
withheld or withdrawn so that food and water can be administered 
invasively. 
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.2(C)(1) (emphasis added). Although this illustrative 
form expressly addresses only the patient’s decision either to receive or forego 
the invasive administration of nutrition and hydration, the scope of the patient’s 
acknowledged right to accept or refuse treatment under the Act would encompass 
any intervention that constitutes a life-sustaining procedure which, by definition, 
“would serve only to prolong the dying process.” Id. § 40:1151.1(A)(8). Thus, in 
the case of Sonya Causey, that right would have related not only to the provision 
of artificial nutrition and hydration, but also to dialysis and mechanical 
ventilation.  




The holding in Causey also is inconsistent with the statute’s immunity 
scheme, which insulates physicians from liability when they act to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in accordance with their 
patients’ wishes.97 The legislature granted this immunity to alleviate a 
physician’s concern about adverse legal and professional consequences 
that might attend the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment, even when he acted at the patient’s request.98 Although this 
provision only implicitly reflects the voluntary nature of the patient’s right 
of refusal, it does so with a very practical force: the granting of immunity 
is qualified by thinly veiled threats of civil and criminal liability to a 
physician who withholds or withdraws treatment without the patient’s 
consent.99 In this way, it reinforces the patient-centered focus of the law.100 
The analysis in Causey is noticeably silent with respect to these key 
provisions, each of which suggest that the court granted an undue 
deference to the physician’s discretion. Finding the facts of the case to 
present a question concerning the physician’s exercise of “medical 
judgment”—because the physician had withdrawn treatment he 
considered to be “medically inappropriate”—the court in effect shifted the 
legal theory of the case from the Natural Death Act, which emphasizes the 
“voluntary and permissive” nature of a patient’s right to accept or refuse 
life-sustaining procedures,101 to the Medical Malpractice Act, which 
invokes the professional standard of care to resolve allegations of 
malpractice.102 By invoking the professional care standard of care, 
however, the court made the patient’s right to direct the provision of care 
subject to the physician’s approval. In light of that result, it is difficult to 
                                                                                                             
 97. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7. 
 98. See id. § 40:1151.7(A)(1)–(2) (granting physicians and other health care 
providers immunity from criminal prosecution, civil liability, and professional 
sanctions, but only with respect to the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures with the consent of the patient or an authorized surrogate). 
See also id. § 40:1151.7(C)(1) (expressly denying immunity if it is shown that 
“the person authorizing or effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures . . . did not act in good faith compliance with the intention 
of the . . . patient”); id. § 40:1151.8(B) (subjecting to criminal prosecution any 
persons who act in various ways to cause the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment contrary to the patient’s wishes); id. § 40:1151.8(A) 
(subjecting to civil liability persons who conceal a patient’s declaration reflecting 
an intent to refuse treatment, presumably in order to circumvent the patient’s 
choice to refuse treatment). 
 99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
 100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
 101. LA. REV. STAT. § 50:1151.1(B). 
 102. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 




reconcile the court’s construction of the terms “medical judgment” and 
“medically inappropriate treatment” with the legislative intent underlying 
the Natural Death Act. 
A careful construction of the Act indicates that the legislature did not 
employ these terms to recognize a physician’s unilateral authority to deny 
life-sustaining treatment when the patient has not exercised his right to 
refuse it. To the contrary, these terms must be construed in a manner that 
furthers, rather than contradicts, the fundamental purpose of the statute. 
When one considers the terms “medical judgment” and “medically 
inappropriate treatment” in that context, reason suggests that the 
legislature employed them only to deny a physician’s professional 
obligation to provide interventions that are futile in a physiological sense 
or that the patient has refused. 
Under this construction, the statute implicitly would require the 
application of life-sustaining procedures that a patient or an authorized 
surrogate has requested.103 Although questions remain about the ultimate 
scope of one’s right to refuse treatment in a constitutional sense, the 
jurisprudence out of which the Act arose clearly establishes that these 
decisions belong to the patient alone, and the terms of the Act lend 
themselves to the same conclusion.104 Moreover, even if one were to find 
ambiguity in the Act’s silence concerning the patient’s positive right to 
compel the provision of “life-sustaining procedures” and, conversely, 
concerning the physician’s unilateral authority to deny them, the statute 
expressly provides that any ambiguities in the law are to be resolved in a 
way that preserves human life.105 
                                                                                                             
 103. This would not be so with respect to interventions that are not medically 
indicated because they are futile in an objective, physiological sense. The 
physician would have no duty to provide such measures, nor would the patient 
have the right to demand them. 
 104. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151(A)(1), 40:1151(A)(3), 40:1151(B); see 
generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan, 
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Bouvia v Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In Re Conroy, 486 
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
 105. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(D). It is interesting to note that the Second 
Circuit did not address the provisions of the Act that indicate the legislature’s 
intention that the patient be recognized as the sole bearer of this right. Several 
express provisions of the Act thus negate any argument that it would sanction the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment that a patient or his 
surrogate has requested. Rather, the court rested its opinion entirely on the 
legislature’s more general expression of its “purpose, findings and intent” for 
enacting the statute:  




Finally, not only does the Act contradict the Causey court’s construction 
of the terms “medical judgment” and “medically inappropriate treatment,” 
it employs those terms in a manner that informs the inquiry about the 
definition of “medical futility” in the context of life-sustaining procedures. 
C. The Statutory Meaning of the Term “Medical Judgment” 
In a colloquial sense, and broadly speaking, the term “medical judgment” 
might commonly be understood to reflect the outcome of the clinical decision 
process. Although one might be inclined to see that process as objective in 
nature, it is widely acknowledged that medical judgment is not purely 
objective in an abstract, scientific sense, even when it concerns the 
physiological efficacy of a particular intervention. Rather, the process of 
interpreting data and determining the appropriate course of action in a 
particular case is so inherently equivocal that it has been described as “a 
science of uncertainty and an art of probability.”106 
Although these uncertainties inevitably require physicians to exercise 
professional discretion when analyzing objective data about the efficacy of 
a clinical protocol, it is apparent from both the text and structure of the Act 
that the legislature did not intend for the term “medical judgment” to 
encompass all professional opinions in the end-of-life clinical setting. By its 
very purpose, the Act directly and intentionally interferes with physician 
judgments concerning the provision of life-sustaining procedures simply by 
                                                                                                             
In recognizing a terminal patient's right to refuse care, La. R.S. 
40:1299.58.1(A)(4) states that the statute is not to be construed “to 
require the application of medically inappropriate treatment or life-
sustaining procedures to any patient or to interfere with medical 
judgment with respect to the application of medical treatment or life-
sustaining procedures.” 
Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075. Louisiana Revised Statute section 
40:1299.58.1(A)(4) was re-codified without revision as section 40:1151(A)(4) in 
2015. Then, noting that the statute did not define either “medical judgment” or 
“medically inappropriate treatment,” the court concluded that a determination of 
whether treatment is “medically inappropriate” necessarily entails the application 
of the sort of “medical judgment” with which the Act was intended not to 
interfere. Id. 
 106. One oft-cited adage illustrates this uncertainty in these terms: “Heaven 
knows; who can tell? [W]ho shall decide when doctors disagree?” Quote of 
unknown origin, cited in PETER MARK ROGET, ROGET’S THESAURUS 154 (1941). 
Clinical medicine has been described as “a science of uncertainty and an art of 
probability,” with “[t]he central task of clinicians [being] to reduce uncertainty to 
the extent possible by using clinical data, medical science, and reasoning to reach 
a diagnosis and propose a plan of care.” CLINICAL ETHICS, supra note 10, at 26. 




recognizing that patients possess the unqualified right to refuse them.107 
From the opposite perspective, the Act would interfere with the clinical 
judgment of a physician who might prescribe a lethal agent as a palliative 
measure after determining that there is no other way to relieve a patient’s 
unrelenting and intolerable pain. The Act directly interferes with a physician’s 
judgment in these cases by expressly providing that it does not authorize or 
condone either euthanasia or assisted suicide.108 In these ways, the statute 
recognizes and constrains the scope of both the patient’s autonomy and the 
physician’s discretion with respect to health care decisions at the end of life. 
These legislative boundaries implicitly reflect the law’s intended 
deference to a physician’s judgment under the Act. For example, a physician’s 
diagnosis of a “terminal and irreversible condition” or classification of an 
intervention as a “life-sustaining procedure” would clearly reflect the sort of 
judgment with which the statute is intended not to interfere. Professional 
judgments concerning the physiological efficacy of potential clinical 
interventions would also operate independently of the Act.109 Disputes 
about such professional judgments, therefore, would be subject to the legal 
standards and procedural requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. 
However, such professional judgments are unlike the profound 
personal decisions that patients and their families face when considering 
whether to accept or refuse life-sustaining interventions. As these 
decisions implicate intensely personal considerations that are both unique 
to the patient and wholly unrelated to the exercise of medical judgment, 
the statute expressly places them within the sole discretion of the patient 
                                                                                                             
 107. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151.2(A)(1), 40:1151.4(A)(1), 40:1151.4(A)(2) 
(2016). The Act expressly recognizes the authority of a surrogate to refuse such 
treatment on behalf of a patient who lacks decisional capacity. 
 108. Id. § 40:1151.9(A). 
 109. It is interesting to note that Causey did not involve a dispute about such 
matters of professional discretion. Although the court did not expressly hold either 
that the patient suffered from a “terminal and irreversible condition” or that the 
procedures at issue constituted “life-sustaining procedures” as defined in the Act, 
the facts of the case, together with the inference drawn from the court’s reference 
to the Act as the appropriate rule of law for deciding it, strongly imply that the 
case did fall within the scope of the statute. See Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1074 (Sonya 
Causey was believed to be permanently unconscious, and she was dependent on 
hemodialysis, mechanical ventilation, and artificially administered nutrition and 
hydration, all of which constituted “life-sustaining procedures.”). The opinion 
further suggests that, in framing the issue, the court considered the physician’s 
decision to withdraw treatment as a reflection of his “medical judgment” about 
whether it would have been “medically inappropriate” to continue it under the 
circumstances. Though not expressly stated, the court’s analysis clearly rests on 
these premises. 




or an authorized surrogate.110 Although the need for these decisions arises 
out of a physician’s exercise of professional medical judgment concerning 
the patient’s status under the Act, the statute invokes the patient’s 
preference as the sole reference point for deciding whether treatment 
should be provided.111  
In essence, it might be said that the statute implicitly recognizes a 
meaningful distinction between the patient’s right to refuse treatment and 
the physician’s authority to bring about death, whether directly by 
employing an active intervention or indirectly by refusing to honor a 
request for treatment that reasonably would be expected to prolong the 
patient’s life. The narrow statutory definition of a “life-sustaining 
procedure” reflects this fundamental distinction, which the Act reinforces 
by expressing the voluntary and permissive nature of the patient’s right to 
refuse treatment.112 Thus, the Act consummates its intended purpose by 
limiting the definition of “medical judgment” to clinical decisions that 
reflect a physician’s professional, clinical opinion, rather than his personal 
or philosophical perspective. The expansive view of medical judgment 
adopted in Causey, however, would contradict the legislative purpose of 
the Act. 
D. The Statutory Meaning of the Term “Medically Inappropriate 
Treatment” and its Relationship to the Concept of Medical Futility 
In addition to expressing a virtually boundless view of “medical 
judgment,” the opinion in Causey rested on the premise that a physician 
necessarily employs such judgment when determining if it would be 
“medically inappropriate” to provide a life-sustaining procedure.113 It is 
self-evident that all clinical decisions inevitably reflect the exercise of 
some degree of medical judgment. Nevertheless, the underlying purpose 
of the Act suggests that the professional standard of care by which 
                                                                                                             
 110. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151.2, 1151.4. 
 111. Id. §§ 40:1151(A)(1), 1151(A)(3), 1151(B)(1)(2). 
 112. Id. § 40:1151(B)(1), (2). 
 113. According to the court, 
Standards of medical malpractice require a physician to act with the degree 
of skill and care ordinarily possessed by those in that same medical specialty 
acting under the same or similar circumstances. Departure from this 
prevailing standard of care, coupled with harm, may result in professional 
malpractice liability. A finding that treatment is “medically inappropriate” 
by a consensus of physicians practicing in that specialty translates into a 
standard of care. 
Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1076 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.41). 




expressions of medical judgment are measured does not inform the 
intended meaning of “medically inappropriate treatment.”114 Rather, 
considered in context, the term should be construed first in contrast to the 
term “life-sustaining procedure,” against which it is juxtaposed in the 
statute, and second with reference to treatment—whether life-sustaining 
or not—that the patient has, in fact, refused.115 Considered within these 
parameters, a medical intervention would be found inappropriate under the 
Act either if the patient has refused it, or if it is futile in an objective, 
physiological sense. By definition, a “life-sustaining procedure” that a 
patient has requested would satisfy neither of these tests.116 
The specific statutory provision at issue in Causey provides that it is 
“not to be construed ‘to require the application of medically inappropriate 
treatment or life-sustaining procedures to any patient.’”117 The statute’s use 
                                                                                                             
 114. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4). 
 115. Id. § 40:1151(B)(3). Under this construction, the term “medical 
judgment” would have meaning for purposes of determining whether a patient’s 
condition is “terminal and irreversible,” or if the treatment at issue is a “life-
sustaining procedure.” Id. § 40:1151(A)(2). Once those determinations have been 
made, the question of whether treatment should be provided would require not the 
exercise of medical judgment, but the consent of the patient. Id. § 40:1151(A)(2). 
 116. With respect to the patient’s right to refuse measures that lie beyond the 
narrow scope of the Act, however, the question is somewhat more nebulous 
because it is sprinkled with a less certain mix of traditional principles of law 
concerning end-of-life care. Nevertheless, the Act expressly provides that its 
terms are “cumulative with existing law” concerning the patient’s right to accept 
or refuse treatment, the threshold of which, theoretically, would arise at the point 
where the individual’s interest in autonomy outweighs the state’s interest in the 
preservation of life. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(C). For example, In re 
Quackenbush involved a patient with decisional capacity who refused an 
amputation that his physician expected to save his life, and without which death 
was certain. 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Morris Cty. Ct. 1978). Although this procedure 
was not futile in a physiological sense, the court found that he had the right to 
refuse it. Id. at 790. One might expect the same result in Louisiana. In such cases, 
the procedure would be “medically inappropriate” simply because the patient 
refused it, even though it would not have been a life-sustaining procedure under 
the Act and thus not subject to the absolute right of refusal as recognized in the 
statute. 
 117. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075 (first quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 
40:1151(A)(4), and then quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(3)) (emphasis 
added). Under this construction, the term “medical judgment” would have 
meaning for purposes of determining whether a patient is terminally ill or if the 
treatment at issue is a “life-sustaining procedure.” Once those determinations have 
been made, the question of whether the treatment should be provided would 
require not the exercise of medical judgment, but the consent of the patient. 




of the disjunctive “or” to separate these terms suggests quite strongly a 
legislative intent to treat them independently.118 This grammatical basis for 
the distinction is buttressed by the fact that a synonymous construction 
would yield a result contrary to the stated purpose of the law by creating an 
obligation on the part of the patient to refuse treatment, rather than merely 
recognizing one’s right to do so.119 By construing the statute as recognizing 
a physician’s authority to declare a life-sustaining procedure as “medically 
inappropriate,” the court’s analysis in Causey would effectively condition a 
patient’s right to refuse treatment on the physician’s consent, thus negating 
the voluntary nature of that right as expressly defined in the law, and 
rendering the statute internally inconsistent.120 This result could be avoided 
only by construing these terms separately. This is not to deny that there 
are occasions when it might be medically inappropriate for a physician to 
provide a life-sustaining procedure, but to say merely that these terms need 
not universally be construed as synonymous, and that they sometimes must 
be distinguished to give effect to the statute’s underlying purpose. 
The necessity of drawing a distinction between a life-sustaining 
procedure and treatment that is medically inappropriate can also be 
demonstrated by categorizing treatment modalities in terms of their 
expected efficacies and then correlating them with the patient’s right to 
accept or refuse treatment, the state’s countervailing interest in the 
preservation of life, and the physician’s professional obligations. This 
approach not only clarifies the meaning of these key terms in the statute, 
but also leads to a very practical definition of futility that comports with 
the voluntary nature of the patient’s right as recognized in the Act.121 
As the Act was intended to establish a reasonable balance between the 
competing interests of the individual in exercising his autonomy and the 
state in the preservation of life, reason posits that the state waived that 
interest to the extent the legislature expressly recognized a patient’s 
unqualified right to refuse treatment.122 Logic further suggests that the 
state’s interest in preserving life is, by definition, a function of the 
                                                                                                             
 118. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151(A)(4), 40:1151(B)(3).  
 119. See id. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(1)–(2). 
 120. Causey, 719 So. 2d 1072; LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4). The holding 
in Causey also would deny the term “medically inappropriate treatment” any 
substantive effect. It would be meaningless to say that it encompasses clinical 
interventions that lack physiological efficacy simply because the law has never 
obligated physicians to provide measures that are futile in an objective, 
physiological sense. 
 121. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(1). 
 122. Id. §§ 40:1151(A), 1151.2, 1151.4.  




professional expectation that a clinical intervention will positively affect a 
patient’s injury, illness, or disease in a physiological sense. 
The concept of medical futility can be seen as an inverted function of 
the same expectancy. Under this view, the state’s interest and the concept 
of futility would lie at opposite ends of the same spectrum: as the expected 
benefit from a particular treatment protocol increases, the state’s interest 
grows and futility dims. Likewise, the state’s interest becomes ever more 
dim as the expected benefit declines, making it increasingly futile. This 
gradation of treatment along the spectrum of futility versus efficacy is 
similar to the correlation historically drawn by the courts between the 
individual’s right to refuse treatment and the state’s interest in preserving 
life—the individual’s right grows and the state’s interest diminishes as the 
degree of invasiveness increases and as the prognosis dims.123 
In this sense, the concept of medical futility and the scope of a patient’s 
abstract, constitutional right to refuse treatment are correlative and thus 
subject to equal degrees of ambiguity. Yet, this analysis offers a meaningful 
and workable definition of futility in the context of the Act, and it does so 
without violating the purpose of the statute. It is self-evident that the law 
would universally define as both “medically inappropriate” and objectively 
“futile” any intervention that offers no prospect of relieving, mitigating, or 
deterring the progression of a patient’s illness, disease, or injury.124 Such 
interventions would be absolutely futile in a physiological sense. It follows 
that neither the professional standard of care nor the state’s interest in 
preserving life would obligate a physician to provide such measures, nor 
would the law recognize a patient’s right to demand them.125 
                                                                                                             
 123. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (“The nature of 
Karen’s care and the realistic chances of her recovery are quite unlike those of the 
patients discussed in many of the cases where treatments were ordered. In many 
of those cases the medical procedure required (usually a transfusion) constituted 
a minimal bodily invasion and the chances of recovery and return to functioning 
life were very good. We think that the state’s interest contra weakens and the 
individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and 
the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s rights 
overcome the State interest.”). 
 124. Physicians are not ethically obligated to provide care that has no 
reasonable chance of benefiting their patients. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE 
OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2016) (“Chapter 5: Opinions on Caring for Patients at the 
End of Life”), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2035.page? [https://perma.cc/V3CY-TPA7]. 
 125. The President’s Commission on Bioethics explains a physician’s ethical 
duties in this regard as follows:  
A health care professional has an obligation to allow a patient to choose from 
among medically acceptable treatment options (whether provided by the 




However, such objectively inappropriate interventions differ 
significantly from life-sustaining procedures. These measures, by definition, 
yield an identifiable physiological effect in the sense that they postpone the 
moment of death, though without offering any hope of an ultimate 
remedy.126 In light of this benefit, it would seriously distort the traditional 
balance in the physician–patient relationship if the law were to place a 
patient’s affirmative request for such measures at the discretion of his 
physician by treating them as a matter subject to the exercise of medical 
judgment. This conclusion is grounded both in the doctrine of informed 
consent and in the statute, which clearly recognizes that the patient’s right 
to direct the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures is a 
permissive right rather than a legal duty.127 It also is in accord with 
fundamental principles of bioethics that reflect the patient’s right of self-
determination. According to the President’s Commission on Bioethics, 
Respect for the self-determination of competent patients is of 
special importance in decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment 
because different people will have markedly different needs and 
concerns during the final period of their lives; living a little longer 
will be of distinctly different value to them. Decisions about life-
sustaining treatment, which commonly affect more than one goal 
of a patient (for example, prolongation of life and relief of 
suffering) create special tensions. Nonetheless, a process of 
collaborating and sharing information and responsibility between 
care givers and patients generally results in mutually satisfactory 
decisions. Even when it does not, the primacy of a patient’s 
interests in self-determination and in honoring the patient’s own 
view of well-being warrant leaving with the patient the final 
authority to decide.128  
Two legal consequences might be inferred from a patient’s decision to 
exercise this right: first, that the state’s interest in preserving life is 
implicitly and automatically waived when a patient refuses a life-
                                                                                                             
professional or by appropriate colleagues to whom the patient is referred) or 
to reject all options. No one, however, has an obligation to provide 
interventions that would, in his or her judgment, be countertherapeutic. 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN 
TREATMENT DECISIONS 44 (1983). 
 126. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(8), (14). 
 127. Id. § 40:1151(B)(1), (2). 
 128. Id. 




sustaining procedure; and second, that it would be “medically 
inappropriate” for a physician to provide such treatment after the patient 
has refused it. In this sense, the patient’s refusal of treatment would reflect 
his own subjective determination that it would be “futile” for him to 
receive a life-sustaining procedure, without regard to the unique, personal 
reasons that might have led him to make that choice. In effect, this 
approach would define futility with reference to the patient’s subjective 
preference, as justified by the voluntary nature of his right under the statute 
either to accept or refuse treatment. Thus, the law would define any “life-
sustaining procedure” as both “medically inappropriate” and “futile” if, in 
fact, the patient has declined it.129 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. § 40:1151(A)(4). The same logic would support a definition of 
treatment as futile if it would cause such intolerable and interminable pain to a 
patient who, though conscious, permanently lacks decision-making capacity. In 
those circumstances, the courts might infer the patient’s decision to refuse 
treatment under either the pure or the limited objective tests as developed by the 
court in In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The facts of Causey also raise 
the issue of whether the physician’s unilateral act of withdrawing life-sustaining 
procedures would be legitimated by the fact that continued treatment would have 
been inhumane. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 
1998). The professional standard arguably would be relevant if the patient has not 
directed the withdrawal of treatment and is suffering in which event it might be 
appropriate to apply a version of either the “pure objective” or “limited objective” 
tests developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy when addressing the 
propriety of a physician’s unilateral decision to withdraw a life-sustaining 
procedure; a determination that the patient was suffering arguably would be 
subject to the professional standard and, thus, to review by a medical review panel. 
Conroy, 489 A.2d 1209. The Conroy court employed these tests to find a 
presumption that the patient would have refused treatment if he were capable of 
arriving at a reasoned decision. Id. Under the “pure objective” test, treatment may 
be withheld or withdrawn even in the absence of any evidence that the patient 
would have refused care as long as he is suffering intolerable and intractable pain, 
such that treatment would be inhumane. The related “limited objective” test would 
apply where there exists “some evidence” that the patient would have refused 
treatment, and where the burdens of treatment “clearly and markedly outweigh” 
the benefits of that treatment. Neither the “pure objective” or “limited objective” 
test, however, would justify a physician’s unilateral decision to withhold or 
withdraw a “life-sustaining procedure.” Rather, these tests would be consistent 
with the voluntary nature of the patient’s decision to refuse treatment, because 
they merely provide a means of inferring whether the patient would exercise that 
right if he were capable of expressing a reasoned choice. Further, the objective 
tests developed in Conroy are interesting when applied to a case like Causey, 
because they were devised to address the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from conscious, but incompetent patients in a nursing home 




Reason compels the opposite conclusion when a patient or his surrogate 
requests a life-sustaining procedure.130 The Act reflects the legislature’s 
intent to retain the state’s interest in preserving life in such cases, as 
evidenced by the narrow scope of the term “life-sustaining procedure,” the 
explicitly voluntary nature of the patient’s right to refuse such measures, 
and the requirement that any doubt concerning application of the statute 
be resolved in favor of preserving life.131  
Finally, a rational extension of this logic also suggests something 
further—that the Act reflects the legislative intent not only to retain the 
state’s interest in preserving life when the patient has not exercised his 
right to refuse a life-sustaining procedure, but implicitly to translate that 
interest into the patient’s correlative right to insist that the physician 
provide it. In short, the voluntary nature of a patient’s “negative” right to 
refuse treatment that will merely postpone the moment of death implicitly 
affords a corresponding “positive” right to compel its provision, and the 
state’s interest in preserving life continues unabated with respect to those 
interventions until such time as the patient has, in fact, refused them. To 
construe the law in any other manner would permit physicians to 
unilaterally withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, thereby 
defeating both the voluntary nature of the patient’s decision either to 
accept or refuse such treatment and the very purpose of the Act. 
                                                                                                             
who tend to be subjected to a more significant risk of abuse than patients in the 
hospital setting. The patient in Causey, however, not only was unconscious, but 
she was in the hospital where regular physician consultations and ethics 
committee reviews were available. Causey, 719 So. 2d 1072. The hospital in fact 
had submitted the case for review by the ethics committee, which found that 
treatment should be withdrawn even over the objection of the patient’s surrogate 
decision maker, and the physician defended his decision to withdraw treatment on 
the grounds that the patient was suffering. Id. To withhold treatment from a patient 
who is suffering would be justified, however, not on the grounds of “futility,” but 
by the inference that the patient would have refused it. 
 130. This is not to say that the patient’s silence is to be taken either as an 
implicit acceptance or as a refusal of treatment, but that the core issue relates to 
the determination of whether the patient would have refused or accepted the 
treatment if he were capable of expressing a reasoned decision. As a matter of 
custom, such determinations are made with reference to the substituted judgment 
standard. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 131. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(E). (“It is the policy of the state of 
Louisiana that human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural 
death. When interpreting this Subpart, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to 
preserve human life . . . .”). 




III. RESOLVING THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF THE LAW CONCERNING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT AND MEDICAL FUTILITY  
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Causey reflects the law’s continuing 
struggle with the notion of medical futility, both in the abstract and in the 
context of the statute. Although the Causey court was understandably 
reluctant to address the issue from a philosophical perspective, it found no 
greater comfort in the specific provisions of the Act. As argued in this 
Article, however, the case might have been resolved with greater certainty 
had the court considered the definition of “medically inappropriate 
treatment” both as a sui generis term and in light of the statute’s structure 
and purpose.132 In this manner, the court could have concluded that the 
treatment at issue was neither futile nor medically inappropriate. 
Although the Act can be construed in a way that effectively defines 
futile care with reference to the patient’s decision to accept or refuse 
treatment, it is important to bear in mind that it would do so more by 
coincidence than design. The correlation of the patient’s choice to the 
definition is inferential rather than direct because the statute was drafted 
not to provide an express definition of medical futility, but to give effect 
to a patient’s basic right to grant or deny consent to treatment.133 However, 
construing the statute in such a way that recognizes a physician’s authority 
to deny the very treatment it places at the patient’s discretion would be 
inconsistent with the statute’s purpose. Thus, while a patient’s refusal of a 
particular form of treatment might establish a basis for defining it as both 
futile and medically inappropriate, it is the exercise of his right to accept 
or refuse treatment on which those definitions turn. In short, the mere fact 
that treatment would be considered futile if the patient were to refuse it 
does not render it inherently futile and therefore beyond his right to accept. 
It is this subtle point that the Causey court overlooked.134 
                                                                                                             
 132. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4); see Pope, supra note 5, at 41–42 
nn.214–217, 72–74 nn.423–437, 78 n.466.  
 133. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-16.  
 134. Causey, 719 So. 2d 1072. Although this construction of the Act would 
have equal merit under similar schemes in other states, the literal terms of some 
statutes, such as the Uniform Act, do not as readily lend themselves to that view. 
Some commentators strongly contend that the literal terms of the Uniform Act 
accommodate a physician’s unilateral withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. For a comprehensive discussion of this view see generally 
Pope, supra note 5. This potential disparity among the states is ironic when one 
considers the fact that many bioethicists initially were concerned that the 
complexity and limited immunity provisions found in these schemes might lead 
physicians to construe them narrowly, thus effectively constraining rather than 




The Causey court’s construction of the Act as conferring unilateral 
decision-making authority on physicians neither resolves nor informs the 
substance of the ongoing futility debate. Nor does it relieve physicians of 
the potentially significant legal consequences that would follow a 
unilateral decision to withhold or withdraw treatment from a patient who 
has not refused it. Moreover, to construe the statute in that manner would 
not reduce the likelihood of judicial involvement in these questions, which 
the courts have long regarded as more amenable to resolution in the 
clinical setting by consensus among physicians, patients, and family 
members than in the adversarial environment of litigation. To the contrary, 
it likely would generate litigation in a significant number of cases. 
The conflicting arguments about how the statute should be construed 
in the context of questions about medical futility suggest that the law might 
not offer a certain resolution to this significant issue. Perhaps in 
recognition of that continuing uncertainty, statutory methods have been 
proposed to resolve, on an ad hoc basis, the impasse created when patients 
or their surrogates request treatment that physicians believe to be 
inappropriate under the circumstances.135 For example, Texas has enacted 
a statute under which a physician who opposes a request for life-sustaining 
treatment may initiate a review of the case by the hospital ethics 
committee.136 Perhaps to ensure due process and enhance the opportunity 
of building a consensus about the appropriate course of action, the law 
confers upon the patient’s surrogate the right to attend the meeting.137 If 
the committee concludes that it would be inappropriate to continue 
treatment under the circumstances of the case, the physician would be 
obligated both to make a reasonable attempt to transfer the patient to 
another facility that is willing to comply with his directive138 and to 
continue providing care for ten days after the ethics committee’s 
                                                                                                             
reinforcing the patient’s ability to refuse treatment without first seeking judicial 
approval. The potential for such mischief in the codification of these schemes was 
seen, not in the risk that physicians would deny care that a patient had requested, 
but that they would insist on providing care the patient did not want. See generally 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1. The contemporary argument that advance 
directive statutes should be construed to remove end-of-life decisions from the 
subjective preference of patients and place them within the professional discretion 
of physicians is difficult to reconcile to this history. 
 135. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2016). 
 136. Id. § 166.046(a). The Texas statute does not attempt to define medical 
futility, but provides a legal process for resolving disputes about the propriety of 
continued treatment. See Pope, supra note 5, at 80.  
 137. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046(b)(2), (4).  
 138. Id. § 166.046(d). 




decision.139 The statute authorizes the termination of treatment if the patient 
has not been not transferred within the prescribed ten-day window.140 
Although this process-based approach appears to have been well 
received, questions have been raised about certain provisions of the Texas 
statute. For example, some suggest that the ten-day transfer window might 
not provide a meaningful period of time within which to locate a facility 
and effect the patient’s transfer.141 Questions also have been presented 
about whether the judicial authority142 to extend the transfer deadline is 
deficient in terms of process.143 Finally, concerns have been expressed 
about potential due process implications arising from conflicts of interest 
posed by the composition of the ethics committee charged with reviewing 
a physician’s denial of treatment.144 
These questions aside, a process-based approach would seem to offer 
a more practical and meaningful way to resolve disputes about medical 
futility than an ambiguous advance directive statute such as the Act would 
afford. Such a scheme would be most meaningful if the Act minimized the 
potential for disputes at the outset. In the context of life-sustaining 
modalities, the potential for conflict most likely would arise if the statute 
were construed to accord physicians the unilateral authority to withhold or 
withdraw treatment from a patient who has not refused it.145 As a 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. § 166.046(e). 
 140. Id. Although commentators report that this scheme appears to have 
significantly increased ethics consultations in Texas, they also note that providers 
rarely invoke their authority under the statute to withdraw treatment unilaterally 
in cases that ultimately prove to be intractable. See Pope, supra note 5, at 69 
(noting that Texas providers decided to unilaterally stop life-sustaining medical 
treatment only in 2% of intractable cases).  
 141. Pope, supra note 5, at 80. 
 142. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046(g).  
 143. See Nikolouzos v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 684 
(Tex. App. 2005) (Fowler, J., concurring) (recommending that the statute be 
clarified with respect to the court’s authority to grant an extension by identifying 
the court in which the petition to extend the time for transfer must be filed by 
specifying the process for an appeal when a court refuses to grant an extension). 
 144. See Pope, supra note 5, at 80.  
 145. Several amici in the assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg 
and Vacco v. Quill emphasized the importance of insulating physicians from 
increasing pressures brought to bear on them by society to assist patients in ending 
their lives when nothing further can be done for them. See, e.g., Brief for Bioethics 
Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 657754; Brief of Family 
Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858), 1996 WL 656275. For 




preliminary matter, a dispute resolution scheme would be most effective 
in Louisiana if it were coupled with a provision in the Act that clearly 
negates any such authority.  
Having established that foundation, a scheme along the lines of the 
Texas statute might offer a viable framework for establishing a process to 
resolve futility-related disputes in Louisiana, but with three modifications. 
First, the scheme should abate the potential for conflicts of interest due to 
the composition of the ethics committee by ensuring that it is composed of 
persons not affiliated either with the health care facility or the physicians 
involved in the patient’s care in a way that would call their independence 
into question and thus compromise, by perception, the integrity of the 
review process. Second, it should give the committee sufficient flexibility 
and time either to build a consensus concerning the appropriate course of 
treatment or to shape a practical compromise when no consensus is 
possible.146 Third, it should provide for an expedited process for judicial 
                                                                                                             
example, Professors Annas, Glanz, and Mariner stated, “[P]hysician assisted 
suicide is recognized, even by the two Circuit Courts of Appeal that have asserted 
that it is a constitutional right, as far too dangerous a right to be exercised by 
patients and physicians alone.” Brief for Bioethics Professors, supra, at 29. The 
Family Research Council made a similar point: “[The Hippocratic Oath’s 
proscription against a physician doing harm to patients] . . . is a priceless 
possession which we cannot afford to tarnish, but society is always attempting to 
make the physician into a killer—to kill the defective child at birth, to leave the 
sleeping pills beside the bed of the cancer patient . . . . [I]t is the duty of society 
to protect the physician from such requests.” Brief of Family Research Council, 
supra, at 4 (quoting MAURICE LEVINE, PSYCHIATRY & ETHICS 324–25 (1972)). 
 146. One of the most significant ways to enhance the potential for building a 
consensus is by refusing to charge the physician with the responsibility that 
inevitably would attend the unilateral authority to deny treatment. Moreover, the 
very fact that an independent committee would be available to review a proposal 
to withhold or withdraw care might be likely to avoid the creation of adversarial 
relationships as the course of treatment progresses. Knowledge that a committee 
will be available for review might itself either enhance the development of trust 
or diminish the likelihood of distrust as care progresses. Like many conflicts, 
disagreements about the provision of treatment are often based on personal 
misunderstandings between the parties and distrust. Two of the key factors likely 
to engender a lack of trust in the medical profession in the context of a physician’s 
denial of life-sustaining treatment are the potential for financial conflicts of 
interest and the diminished respect perceived by terminally ill, disabled, and 
elderly patients relative to those who are young and healthy. According to the 
American Geriatrics Society, in light of how concerns about physician-assisted 
suicide are magnified by managed care cost constraints, 
Patients nearing death are generally quite disabled and their care is 
costly. . . . Decreasing availability and increasing expense in health care 




review should the committee be unsuccessful in forging either a consensus 
or a practical compromise to which both physicians and patient surrogates 
agree. 
A statutory protocol possessing these features would recognize that 
questions about a patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment do not 
directly relate to the exercise of professional medical judgment. Rather, 
questions of a professional nature relate primarily to conclusions about 
whether a particular form of treatment constitutes a life-sustaining 
procedure within the meaning of the Act, or whether the patient either 
suffers from a terminal and irreversible condition or is in a continual and 
profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of recovery. 
Non-diagnostic questions concerning whether a life-sustaining 
procedure should be applied in a particular case, on the other hand, pose 
issues of fact about whether the patient would have accepted or refused 
treatment had he possessed the capacity to express a reasoned decision 
about the matter. Because those questions are more subject to legal 
evidentiary standards than professional medical standards, they are not 
properly the subject of a physician’s professional discretion. 
                                                                                                             
and the uncertain impact of managed care may intensify pressure to 
choose [physician-assisted suicide]. . . . [Physician-assisted suicide] may 
become inherently coercive in a society in which supportive services and 
medical care are often unavailable. It would be ironic, indeed, to have a 
constitutional right to [physician-assisted suicide] when there is no 
guarantee of access to health care. 
Brief of the American Geriatrics Society at 24–25, Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656290. The National 
Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities and the Knights of Columbus raised 
a similar concern about the compounded risks posed by the inter-working of 
managed care cost constraints and discrimination based on disabilities: 
In the end, a condition-based rule in favor of assisted suicide would pour 
into the Constitution a poisonous concoction of warm-hearted, misguided 
pity and cold-hearted utilitarianism. . . . Who stands to benefit most from 
a constitutional policy by which the right to live of vulnerable persons is 
reduced to an alienable interest? Is it the person with a terminal condition 
bent on suicide regardless of what the Constitution holds, or is it a cost-
conscience society seeking more ways to ration its generosity? 
Brief of the National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities and the Knights 
of Columbus at 22, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-
1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656342. Although these are arguments related to 
physician-assisted suicide, the same concerns would seem relevant to the more 
passive means of inducing death by vesting in physicians the unilateral authority 
to deny life-sustaining treatment.  




Finally, by subjecting unresolved cases to judicial review, such a 
statutory process would give effect to the well-established rule of law that 
a patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment survives the loss of 
capacity, thus clearly denying any lawful authority on the part of a 
physician to unilaterally withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
based on the patient’s lack of capacity or any other perceived deficit in 
terms of quality of life. 
CONCLUSION  
Cases in which terminally ill patients request life-sustaining procedures 
that their physicians would deny on the grounds of medical futility are 
inevitably more challenging for physicians than the more customary end-of-
life cases in which the patient refuses such measures. Although these forms 
of treatment, by definition, have no curative properties and thus will serve 
only to prolong the patient’s dying process, the Act inferentially measures 
the physician’s professional obligations solely by the patient’s choice.147 By 
defining life-sustaining procedures as the least common denominator of the 
patient’s absolute right to refuse treatment and by expressly providing that 
the patient’s right is “permissive and voluntary,” the legislature effectively 
tied the hands of physicians with respect to these decisions. 
This result reflects both the Act’s theoretical grounding in the doctrine 
of informed consent and the logical basis for distinguishing between a 
physician who accepts a patient’s refusal of treatment and one who 
engages in an affirmative act that brings about death. More fundamentally, 
it reflects the manner in which the legislature chose to balance the inherent 
conflict between the individual’s right of self-determination and the state’s 
interest in preserving life. 
The law has traditionally recognized that a terminally ill patient does 
not act with the intent to die when he refuses treatment that will serve only 
to prolong the dying process.148 Rather, the law considers death in such 
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 148. The Glucksberg Court specifically addressed the distinction between the 
passive refusal of unwanted medical treatment and the active demand for 
assistance in committing suicide by relying on its holding in Quill for the 
proposition that “the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite 
distinct.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997). In Quill, the 
Supreme Court had rejected the view that the two were entitled to be treated the 
same because the ultimate result in either case was to hasten the patient’s death. 
Rather, the Court found that the distinction between suicide and the refusal of 
treatment “comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.” 
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997). The Court found the distinction relevant 




cases as the natural progression of the underlying injury or disease that 
precipitated the need for treatment.149 For that reason, a physician who 
withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment pursuant to a patient’s 
request is not imputed with the intent to cause death.150 
However, this rationale breaks down when a physician refuses to satisfy 
a patient’s affirmative request for life-sustaining treatment. A physician who 
withholds or withdraws treatment under those circumstances could not 
logically deny an intent to cause death, without regard either to the 
benevolence of his motive or the strength of his conviction that the requested 
treatment would be “futile” in the sense that it would not remedy the 
underlying condition. 
Moreover, the futility argument is subject to a significant impediment in 
fact when the case involves a patient who is believed to be permanently 
unconscious.151 A physician who denies such patients the same treatment that 
he would offer to others who are similarly situated, but not incapacitated, 
would find it difficult to sustain an argument that he considered the treatment 
to be futile and thus “medically inappropriate” or “medically ineffective” in a 
physiological sense.152 
                                                                                                             
from a causation perspective by noting that a patient who refuses life-sustaining 
treatment will die from the natural progression of the underlying disease, while a 
person who ingests a lethal concoction will die from his body’s reaction to that 
substance. Id. In terms of intent, the Court found that a physician who complies 
with a patient’s decision to withhold or withdraw treatment does not necessarily 
intend the patient’s death. Id. Nor did the Court believe that such an intent could 
be inferred from a physician’s affirmative act of providing aggressive palliative 
care that unavoidably hastens death. Id. at 802. The Court did, however, ascribe a 
different intent to a physician who assists a patient in committing suicide, finding 
that they “must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be 
made dead.” Id. (citing Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 367 
(1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).  
 149. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724–25; Quill, 521 U.S. at 802, 807–08. 
 150. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 12-33. 
 151. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re 
Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); In re 
Wanglie, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369 (1991); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 152. The state’s interest in preserving life also would directly challenge a 
physician’s reliance on the concept of medical futility to justify the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment that either a patient or his surrogate has 
requested. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition in 
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill that a state’s interest in preserving 
life is not subject to “judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular 
individual may enjoy,” and that a state may assert that interest “even for those 




Finally, in light of the significance that would attend a physician’s 
unilateral authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, and 
considering the Act’s fundamental purpose of furthering the patient’s right 
to control decisions related to his or her own health care, it stands to reason 
that the legislature would have expressly recognized such authority in the 
statute if it had intended to confer it. Instead, the Act expressly provides 
that the patient’s right is “permissive and voluntary”153 and that any 
ambiguities in the statute “shall be interpreted to preserve human life.”154 
To infer a contrary intent would contradict these express provisions of the 
statute. 
These arguments suggest that the Act need not and should not be 
construed to vest in physicians the sole decision-making authority 
concerning the provision of life-sustaining treatment. This interpretation 
is not to deny the importance of these decisions to physicians and other 
members of the health care team, but to recognize that entrusting these 
matters to the sole discretion of the medical profession would merely beg 
a question of profound significance to a variety of interested parties. It 
would be unrealistic to expect such a deference to adequately address the 
interests of the patient, his family, and society in these matters. Just as 
physician-assisted death has been recognized as “far too dangerous a right 
to be exercised by patients and physicians alone,”155 it would be even more 
dangerous to place in a physician’s hand the unilateral authority to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a patient who has 
requested it. To do so would effectively condone involuntary euthanasia, 
which the statute expressly disavows.156 
Although one might be inclined to consider questions of medical 
futility as raising merely abstract matters of law, bioethics, and the 
professional standard of medical care, at the core of these cases lies a 
fundamental question about the value the law ascribes to human beings. 
As a matter of law, does an individual possess an inherent and unchanging 
value that exists independently of his decisional capacity at any point in 
time during life? Or, is one’s worth derived not from his nature as a human 
                                                                                                             
who are near death.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729–30 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. 
at 282). Although a state’s advance directive statute might reflect an implicit 
waiver of its interest in preserving life to the extent the law expressly 
acknowledges an individual’s unqualified right to refuse treatment, reason posits 
that the state would have retained its interest with respect to forms of treatment 
and circumstances that fall beyond the express scope of the law. 
 153. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(1)–(2) (2016).  
 154. Id. § 40:1151.9(E). 
 155. Brief for Bioethics Professors, supra note 145, at 29. 
 156. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(A). 




being, but from the benefit others might find in his continued biological 
existence?157 Only under the first of these perspectives would the rule of 
law have meaning. The alternative thesis would define “law” as the 
tyranny of a majority, relegating to their subjective preference one’s right 
to continue his or her physical existence. The rule of law would be 
especially precarious in a world so ordered. 
Professor Budziszewski has said that to define any animate being or 
inanimate thing with reference to its functional capacity would be 
“appropriate for things that have no inherent nature, whose identity is 
dependent on our purposes and interests—things that do not intrinsically 
deserve to be regarded in a certain way, but which may be regarded in any 
way which is convenient.”158 C. S. Lewis expressed the same concept in 
this manner: “When we understand a thing analytically and then dominate 
and use it for our own convenience, we reduce it to the level of ‘Nature’ 
in the sense that we suspend our judgements [sic] of value about it, ignore 
its final cause (if any), and treat it in terms of quantity.”159 As applied to 
human beings, therefore, both Budziszewski and Lewis would reject the 
functional, relative view of value. In fact, Lewis went so far as to suggest 
that a society deceives itself when it comes to regard man as a mere object 
of relative value, or as mere “nature . . . which knows no values as against 
that which both has and perceives value,” and that it does so at its peril: 
Man’s conquest of Nature turns out, in the moment of its 
consummation, to be Nature’s conquest of man. Every victory we 
seemed to win has lead us, step by step, to this conclusion. All 
Nature’s apparent reverses have been but tactical withdrawals. We 
thought we were beating her back when she was luring us on. What 
                                                                                                             
 157. By holding that a competent person’s right to refuse medical treatment 
survives the loss of capacity, the jurisprudence concerning patient rights at the 
end of life has consistently acknowledged that all persons have an inherent value 
that exists independently of their decision-making capacity at any point during 
their biological existence. It follows that a person’s inherent value derives from 
his nature as a human being rather than from his physical or intellectual capacity. 
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Opinions, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 469, 526 n.174 (1999). 
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looked to us like hands held up in surrender was really the opening 
of arms to enfold us forever. . . . [A]s soon as we . . . reduc[e] our 
own species to the level of mere Nature . . . the being who stood to 
gain and the being who has been sacrificed is one and the same.160 
Although Lewis penned these thoughts more than 60 years ago, their 
portent is assuming an increasing reality in the United States as illustrated 
by decisions in cases such as Causey161 and related legal arguments that 
advance directive statutes should be construed to vest in physicians with 
the unilateral authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
that a patient or his surrogate has requested. These developments suggest 
the ironic possibility that one’s right to refuse treatment as set forth in the 
Act might be transmuted into an obligation to do so, effectively condoning 
involuntary euthanasia, an intent which the statute expressly refutes.162 
The manner in which the law responds to these renditions of medical 
futility has the potential to influence the future of health care in ways that 
cannot completely be foreseen, but that Lewis suggests portend 
consequences that society would both regret and find difficult to reverse. 
These risks can be avoided if the law remains grounded in the common 
thread that underlies the principles enunciated by the courts in In re 
Quinlan,163 Cruzan,164 In re Conroy,165 Glucksberg,166 and Quill.167 Each 
of these cases reflect the law’s recognition of the inherent value of human 
life as reflected in two prisms: first, the enduring right of each individual 
either to accept or refuse medical treatment, whether through his own 
voice or that of a surrogate, and without regard to his state of decisional or 
functional capacity; and second, the corresponding unqualified interest of 
the state in the preservation of life, including the lives of the weakest and 
most vulnerable among us. 
Both the Act and this body of jurisprudence implicitly recognize that 
each member of the species homo sapiens is by definition a bearer of rights 
and a subject to be held in absolute regard, not because of what he can do, 
but because of what he is by nature.168 In this way, the law presupposes 
that one’s standing as a person who possesses inherent value is not a 
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function either of his condition, his stage of development at any point in 
time, or the value that others might ascribe to him in light of those 
characteristics. In the context of the specific issues addressed in this 
Article, it would follow that a permanently unconscious patient would be 
subject to the same regard as any other person whose capacity is not 
compromised. 
